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Since World War II, a general conception about German corporate gov-
ernance has gradually emerged. This consensus view, founded largely on
scant and unrepresentative evidence, contains a number of exaggerated
claims about the German system of corporate ownership and control. The
scholarly literature is replete with historical and theoretical arguments
about the role—either beneﬁcial or detrimental, but almost always signif-
icant—of Germany’s system of close relationships among ﬁrms and simi-
larly close relationships between ﬁrms and universal banks.1 The common
view holds that large and powerful universal banks dominate the ﬁnancial
landscape today as they have in the past. Early on, economic historians
posited the universal bank as the central player in the industrialization of
Germany, arguing that, from the mid-nineteenth century up to the start of
World War I, these institutions mobilized and then eﬃciently utilized
prodigious amounts of ﬁnancial capital. In this traditional view the lynch-
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1. See the reviews in Calomiris (1995) and Fohlin (1999c). Wellhöner’s (1989) detailed work
on a few large companies turns up a wealth of evidence against the idea of bank domination
during the pre-WWI period.pin of the German universal banking system was direct bank involvement
in the ownership and control of nonﬁnancial corporations. In the ﬁnance
literature, such bank involvement in equity ownership and corporate gov-
ernance has come to be known as relationship banking.
Despite the general enthusiasm—both popular and academic—for the
German style of ﬁnance, and for relationship banking speciﬁcally, a
smaller strand of the ﬁnance literature has always recognized potential hin-
drances inherent in that system. Even at the height of industrialization,
critics lamented the excessive power of the largest banks and the national
emphasis on heavy industry. Recent corporate ﬁnance literature on Ger-
many, particularly since the postreuniﬁcation downturn, has almost com-
pletely turned to exploring the problems of the German ﬁnancial system:
the failures of the universal banks and the underdevelopment of the secu-
rities markets. In the “law and ﬁnance” literature over the past several
years, the questions have moved toward broader issues of governance: the
concentration of ownership and control, the role of families in building up
corporate dynasties or pyramids, the densely networked cross-ownership
among ﬁrms, and the general lack of market mechanisms to eﬃciently dis-
tribute corporate control. In the 1990s, rather than viewing the relation-
ship-oriented system as advantageous, many critics started to blame these
institutional structures for the disappointing performance of the German
economy.
This paper ties together these historical and contemporary concerns,
examining both the overall evolution of ownership structures and the de-
velopment of relationship banking practices within that framework. The
paper also seeks to explain the patterns of involvement that emerge by
looking to economic, political, legal, and even social factors. It aims to
oﬀer some balance between the two extreme views of German corporate
governance and concludes that the German corporate economy has per-
formed well. To be sure, Germany’s corporate organizations diﬀer in note-
worthy ways from those of other countries, and these areas of divergence
may have had an impact on ﬁrms or industries in speciﬁc instances. But the
peculiarities of the German system have neither dramatically helped nor
signiﬁcantly hindered the corporate economy over the very long run.
4.2 Long-Run Patterns of Corporate Ownership and Control
4.2.1 General Patterns of Ownership: Families, Groups, and Pyramids
An ideal analysis would include the precise ownership patterns of Ger-
man corporations dating back to the early industrialization period, but
ﬁrm-level equity ownership data are virtually nonexistent for the pre–
World War II era. As German share companies issued mainly bearer
shares and considered the identity of shareholders to be private informa-
224 Caroline Fohlintion, it is not possible to determine the ownership structure of ﬁrms, much
less to categorize the full population of ﬁrms by owner type or by levels of
ownership dispersion.2Indeed, it is diﬃcult even to provide comprehensive
examples of individual ﬁrms’ ownership structures—other than some fa-
mously family-dominated ﬁrms, such as Krupp.
The material that does exist suggests the existence of two principal lines
in the evolution of corporate ownership and control. First, there is the
emergence and expansion of the limited-liability share company (Aktien-
gesellschaft or AG) form with its accompanying managerial control (see
ﬁgure 4.1 and table 4.1). Second, there is the increasing cooperation and
integration between and among ﬁrms that led to cross-shareholding, com-
munities of interest, corporate groups, and eventually pyramids (an owner-
ship structure that can allow a ﬁrm to exert control over far more equity
stakes than it directly owns). Patterns of the ﬁrst type naturally facilitated
trends of the second type.
Incorporation and the creation of the limited-liability company
(GmbH) comprised the primary means of separating ownership from con-
trol. Not surprisingly, big enterprises took to the AG form of organization
more quickly than average. Private, unincorporated enterprises fell to
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2. For certain ﬁrms, it may be possible to use protocols from shareholder meetings to mea-
sure the dispersion of voting rights and the extent of proxy voting, and some eﬀorts on that
front are underway. Voting rights, however, may bear a highly variable relationship to owner-
ship rights.
Fig. 4.1 Listed ﬁrms versus total stock corporations, 1870–2004
Sources: Deutsche Bundesbank (1976 and various years); Deutsche Börse (1992); Statistis-
ches Bundesamt (1989–95); DAI Factbook (various issues). Data for earliest years come from
multiple sources, described in text.Table 4.1 Number and share capital of joint-stock ﬁrms (AGs) and listings in
Berlin, 1800–1914
Number Share  capital Oﬃcially listed 
Year of AGs (millions of marks) in Berlin




















aPrussia only. Hans-Ulrich Wehler (1987, p. 103).
b1835: Manfred Pohl (1982, p. 171). Listed in Berlin, 1830 and 1850: Brockhage (1910, p.
170).
cNumber of AGs: 1870 is an approximation for all AGs before 1870 in Prussia only, and 1873
is an approximate ﬁgure excluding non-Prussian issues before 1870. Both ﬁgures are from
Horn (1979, p. 136). Oﬃcially listed in Berlin: 1870, 1875, 1880, and 1890 from Ernst Loeb
(1896, p. 246–47; he estimates 395 listed in 1871). Loeb’s ﬁgures are cited in Richard Tilly
(1995).
dNumber and share capital from Rainer Gömmel (1992, p. 152).
eNumber and share capital for 1891 from Deutsche Bundesbank (1976, p. 294).
fBeckerath (1956, vol. 1, p. 153).
gGebhard (1928, p. 103). Loeb (1902, p. 2) estimates 5,500 AGs in the same year.
hDeutsche Bundesbank (1976, p. 294).
iNumber and share capital calculated from Statistisches Jahrbuch fuer das Deutsche Reich, 29
(1908, p. 328). Calculating from Handbuch der Deutschen Aktiengesellschaften (1907) yields
an estimated number of AGs of 5,352. Berlin listings are estimated based on data from Hand-
buch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften (1905–1906).
jNumber of AGs for 1907–14 calculated from Statistisches Jahrbuch (1908–15).
kShare capital from Beckerath (1956, vol. 1, p. 153). Deutsche Bundesbank (1976, p. 294) es-
timates total share capital at 14,737 marks.
lNumber of Berlin-listed ﬁrms from Stillich (1909), as cited in Tilly (1995).
mTotal share capital from Deutsche Bundesbank (1976, p. 294).minor importance compared to the largest ﬁrms well before the end of the
nineteenth century. By 1887, four out of ﬁve of the largest companies were
organized as AGs.3 According to Pross (1965, p. 75), power struggles be-
tween capital lenders and capital administrators arose early on. The au-
thority to dispose of management was in the hands of majority stockhold-
ers, their representatives, and managers further up the hierarchy. The
record, such as it is, suggests that manager-controlled enterprises com-
prised a minority of ﬁrms throughout the nineteenth century. Thus, ma-
jority stockholders and their representatives retained primary control, and
managers held the status of leading employees with important but limited
authority. In this early phase of the history of German corporations, the
generation of owners who had founded, enlarged, and made competitive
the enterprises of the heavy industrialization period still held ultimate
sway. The captains of industry of this era—the likes of Krupp, Thyssen,
Stinnes, Wolﬀ, Stumm, Klöckner, Siemens, and Bosch—possessed both
the necessary equity and the personal authority to maintain solid control
of their concerns. Professional managers outside the circle of major share-
holders also arose, and a few of them clearly belonged among the economic
elite. These employee managers, such as Emil Rathenau at AEG, Georg
von Siemens, Emil Kirdorf at Gelsenkirchen, and others, wielded formi-
dable inﬂuence despite their limited personal stock ownership.
The growing use of the corporate form, and the use of managers to run
operations, led in turn to the second main phenomenon in the history of
German corporate governance: cooperation and concentration among
ﬁrms. The ﬁrst buds of cooperation between enterprises emerged via the
formation of trade and production cartels and the creation of concerns
(Pohl and Treue 1978, p. 7). The process of concern building started quite
late in the century: in 1887, fewer than 20 of the largest 100 industrial enter-
prises took on the form of a concern (Siegrist 1980, p. 86). Most cartels ap-
peared in the economically prosperous years between 1888 and 1891, and
the institution rose to great economic importance in the period between
1895 and 1900. Before 1865 there existed just four cartels, and a decade
later that number was still only eight. By 1885, however, there were 90 car-
tels, and that number was more than doubled, at 210, in 1890. By 1905,
a total of 366 industrial cartels had formed (Sombart 1954, p. 316).
Early Twentieth Century
After the turn of the century, the dual trends in ownership dispersion
and interﬁrm cooperation continued with new vigor. Before World War I,
the total number of AGs grew, while the share of AGs among the biggest
German enterprises remained stable. In 1902, there were well over 5,000
AGs, with a total nominal capital of twelve billion marks. Those numbers
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3. See Siegrist (1980), p. 88 and Wehler (1987), p. 627.grew almost continuously in the prewar years (ﬁgure 4.2). In 1907, as in
1887, 80 percent of the biggest companies were organized as AGs (Hen-
ning 1992, p. 210). In 1907, the majority of enterprises remained entrepre-
neurial enterprises in the sense that small groups of owners, mostly fami-
lies, owned the majority of the equity and controlled strategic decisions.
Even if managers had begun to take over the more routine work of daily
business, in Ziegler’s (2000) view, the dynastic character of the economic
elite was still “quite pronounced.” Almost all industrial “big linkers”—
more than fourteen mandates in supervisory boards of corporations—still
held the role of owner-entrepreneurs with no manager and typically repre-
senting an industrial dynasty of sorts.
Still, the managerial enterprise, with widely dispersed ownership and
salaried managers, had clearly gained importance and continued to do so
in the prewar years (Siegrist 1980, p. 88). The trends toward concentration,
cooperation, and increased size continued unabated, and the large AGs
grew more and more dominant. In 1904, less than 1 percent of AGs held
nearly a quarter of the corporate capital stock. Fewer than 10 percent (400
of 4,740) owned nearly two-thirds of the capital (Pross 1965).
As active as the concentration process was in the early twentieth century,
World War I gave new impetus to these trends. Government incentives and
intervention spurred the further creation and maintenance of cartels, with
particular emphasis on vertical connections among suppliers and produc-
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Fig. 4.2 Listed ﬁrms versus total stock corporations, 1870–1914
Sources: Deutsche Bundesbank (1976 and various years); Deutsche Börse Annual Report
(1992); Statistisches Bundesamt (1989–95); DAI Factbook, May 2003. Data for earliest years
come from multiple sources, described in text.ers (Pohl and Treue 1978, p. 20). Meanwhile, smaller and smaller compa-
nies embraced the growing tendency toward incorporation. By 1919, just 6
percent of all German AGs (326 of 5,710) exceeded ﬁve million marks of
share capital.
The Weimar Republic
After World War I, centrally managed concerns increased in importance
and expanded their linkages via interﬁrm agreements. The tendency to-
ward both concentration and oligarchy increased. During the inﬂation
years between 1919 and 1923, AGs formed at breakneck speed: more than
16,000 AGs appeared by 1923, more than three times the number in exis-
tence in 1919. In 1925, over thirteen thousand AGs were registered with a
total nominal capital of 19.1 billion marks. Nevertheless, many small fam-
ily enterprises remained in the market, and small, unincorporated ﬁrms
still accounted for 90 percent of all enterprises in 1925 (Gömmel 1992,
p. 35). To some, managerial capitalism took over in this period, when large
concerns often dominated both the markets and the cartels with rationally
organized leadership structures, multiplant enterprises, coordinated man-
agement teams, and ambitious sales strategies (James 1986, p. 166). While
managers clearly emerged as a major force, the underlying ownership
structures remain somewhat mysterious. It is assumed, although it prob-
ably cannot be proven with the data that exist, that the big enterprises gen-
erally came more and more under the control of a small oligarchy of major
stockholders and managers (Pross 1965, p. 76). Both types of control—
that maintained by majority stockholders and that turned over to man-
agers—could be found within the leading enterprises. While manager-
controlled concerns likely remained a minority among the big enterprises,
they emerged as a growing and important minority (Ziegler 2000, p. 42).
Although the data are truly too sparse for certainty, Ziegler hypothesizes
that the share of family dynasties in the German economic elite fell
markedly in the early 1920s and was replaced by “new” families from the
bourgeoisie (p. 42).
Patterns of corporate structure and control also varied with industry sec-
tor and business size. In the ﬁnancial sector AGs clearly dominated, with
ninety-three banking and insurance companies holding at least ten million
marks of nominal capital each. The mining and steel industry had seventy-
two AGs of this magnitude, and the electrical and machine industry to-
gether had ﬁfty-ﬁve. Thirty AGs in transport and eighteen in the chemical
industry held over ten million marks of nominal capital. Another seventy
large-scale AGs were dispersed among diﬀerent branches of industry. In
some branches, many smaller ﬁrms incorporated and remained moderate
in size. A large proportion of all AGs operated in the food and luxury food
industry (in 1919 there were 905), but only seven of these ﬁrms held over
ten million marks of share capital at that time.
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horizontal integration quickened after World War I. Thyssen, Rheinische
Stahlwerke, GHH, Krupp, and Hoesch, for example, represent the van-
guard of the trend. In 1925, IG Farbenindustrie AG brought together ma-
jor chemical ﬁrms to create the largest German enterprise in terms of stock
capital. Of the 12,392 AGs existing in 1926 with a total nominal capital of
20.4 billion marks, nearly two thousand (1,967 AGs, with a total nominal
capital of 13.3 billion marks) maintained membership in a concern. In
other words, the stock capital bound up in concerns constituted 65 percent
of the total at that time. That ﬁgure rose to 69 percent the next year and to
almost three-quarters by 1930 (Laux 1998, p. 129). Overall, concentrated
companies held 85 percent of the total nominal capital of all German AGs.
It is claimed that by 1927 virtually all of the 100 largest industrial enter-
prises had become concerns—many in the form of holding companies
(Siegrist 1980, p. 86). Independent, unlinked AGs had become the excep-
tion, while the concern had emerged as the norm (Pross 1965, p. 50).
Perhaps as a natural by-product of these changes in industrial organiza-
tion, managerial enterprises became prevalent in the mining, iron, and
metal industries and in the chemical industry. Managers dominated in the
biggest industrial enterprises regardless of sector. Of the ten largest indus-
trial enterprises with a nominal capital greater than 100 million marks—
Deutsche Erdöl, Harpener, Vereinigte Stahlwerke, Mannesmann, Krupp,
Siemens, AEG, I.G. Farben, Burbach, and Wintershall—only Krupp and
Siemens remained entrepreneurial enterprises. The rest were already man-
agerial enterprises (Siegrist 1980, p. 88).
During the 1930s, implementation of managerial capitalism continued.
More and more, the leaders of enterprises were managers without a dy-
nastical background, and the founders or controlling shareholders re-
treated into the oversight role of supervisory board membership (Ziegler
2000, p. 46). Meanwhile, capital became increasingly concentrated and the
absolute number of AGs fell. In 1930 there were 10,970 AGs with a total
nominal capital of 24.2 billion RM, and in 1932 there were 9,634 AGs with
a total nominal capital of 22.3 billion RM. Fewer than 2 percent of these
AGs held well over half of the total nominal capital.
The Nazi Regime
The Nazi regime reinforced power relationships within concerns. Nazis
encouraged and assisted gentile founder families in retaining control over
their ﬁrms (Joly 1998, p. 111). In 1932, on the eve of the Nazis’ ascent to
power, the number of stock corporations stood at 9,634 (see ﬁgure 4.1).
With the government incentives instituted under the new regime, many
AGs went private and their numbers quickly dropped to pre-WWI levels
(about 5,500 in 1938) and dwindled slightly after that. By 1943, 5,359 stock
corporations remained. For this period, data on ownership and control are
230 Caroline Fohlinstill sorely lacking, and nothing very precise can be said as of yet.4 One
thing is clear: the Nazi regime brought great turmoil to the German cor-
porate landscape and permanently altered the patterns of corporate own-
ership and governance. While they promoted private ownership, the Nazis
simultaneously pushed centralization of control in crucial industries. As it
was in so many other ways, the Nazi period was an exception to German
economic, political, and legal traditions, and one that would have contin-
ued ramiﬁcations for decades to follow.
The Postwar Years (1945–2004)
After the war, the AG regained favor among large ﬁrms. In 1957, 87 of
the 100 biggest companies in terms of business volume were AGs. Another
nine took on the GmbH form, and the remaining four remained in other
forms (Pross 1965, p. 52). More broadly, however, the eﬀects of the war on
incorporation persisted. Whereas in 1943 there were still more than 5,000
stock corporations, the number fell nearly 50 percent to 2,627 by 1960—
approximately the level of the late 1880s.5 Moreover, despite the rapid
growth of the German economy, the number of stock corporations contin-
ued to fall until 1983. The decreasing importance of this company form
can also be seen in the falling number of stock market listings over the same
period (ﬁgure 4.3).
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4. Research eﬀorts with new archival materials are underway and seem promising.
5. See the Deutsches Aktien-Institut (DAI) Factbook.
Fig. 4.3 Listed ﬁrms versus total stock corporations, 1956–2004
Sources: Deutsche Bundesbank (1976 and various years); Deutsche Börse Annual Report
(1992); Statistisches Bundesamt (1989–95); DAI Factbook, May 2003 and June 2004.Data on share ownership in the direct aftermath of World War II are
scarce for West Germany, and the published ﬁgures from the Deutsches
Aktieninstitut go back only to 1960. Still, some broad patterns emerge.
Private households exited the stock markets: The percentage of house-
holds investing in the stock markets steadily declined. In 1950, over 46 per-
cent of all households held shares, but the number declined steadily until
quite recently. By 2000, just over 8 percent of the total German population
held shares. With the mini-boom of 2001, the number had increased to 15
percent of all German households—a level still low compared to the more
than a quarter of the U.S. population that held stocks. Strikingly, the pro-
portion of shareholdings of private households declined by the same pro-
portions: in 1950, private households held nearly half (48.6 percent) of all
shares, but by 1996, the number dropped to only 17 percent. Similarly, the
state decreased its holdings of corporate equity from 12 percent in 1960 to
3.9 percent in 1992.
As families and government decreased equity participation over the pe-
riod, nonﬁnancial ﬁrms became the dominant shareholders in Germany.
The proportion of shares held by nonﬁnancial ﬁrms increased from 18 per-
cent in 1950 to more than 41 percent in 1996. At the same time, ﬁnancial
ﬁrms and foreigners, who held a total of 17 percent of shares in 1960, held
a combined share of 37.1 percent in 1992 (table 4.2).
Similar trends also emerge for uniﬁed Germany in the 1990s. Notably,
however, share ownership by nonﬁnancial ﬁrms dropped to 30 percent by
1998. Simultaneously, insurers and foreign shareholders increased their
shareholdings, along with a new group of institutions, investment funds.
Clearly, the importance of ﬁnancial services ﬁrms versus all other types of
shareholders has grown. While in 1990 banks, insurers, and investment
funds held a combined share of 24.43 percent of all outstanding shares in
Germany, by 1998 that group’s share stood at 37 percent—an increase of
more than 50 percent. A closer look, however, reveals that the direct inﬂu-
ence of the ﬁnancial services sector over the largest companies does not
take the form of majority stakes.
Equity ownership in the 100 largest corporations in Germany has been
remarkably stable and remarkably concentrated in the 1990s. Out of the
100 companies with the highest value added, slightly more than half are
owned by one large shareholder. Another 16 to 21 percent of the sample
has moderately concentrated ownership: that is, there is no majority
owner, but less than half of the shares are dispersed. Less than one-third of
the ﬁrms have widely dispersed ownership (table 4.3).6In all but four of the
ﬁfty-four ﬁrms with concentrated ownership, the majority stakeholders
were foreign investors, public entities, or a private individual, a family, or
an endowment.
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6. See Brickwell (2001), p. 52, table 3.8.This picture depends to some extent on the population of ﬁrms being ex-
amined, but the high concentration of ownership extends across a broad
size range of companies. Between 1993 and 1997, the largest share block
for large manufacturing ﬁrms averaged 81 percent. Even in the case of the
listed AGs, the biggest shareholder held a 53 percent stake on average
(Köke 2001, pp. 284–85). In stark contrast to the largest 100 ﬁrms, over 60
percent of manufacturing ﬁrms had another nonﬁnancial enterprise as
their largest shareholder (Köke, p. 285). However, Köke still argues that
cross-ownership is not widespread in the German manufacturing sector
and seems to be of minor relevance in Germany (p. 285).
The continuous downward trend in the AG population is consistent
with a fundamental economic force: the continued concentration of
industrial power. The simultaneous divestment by households and in-
creased investment by ﬁrms indicates that companies used stock markets
to accumulate shares in other corporations in order to establish capital
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Table 4.2 Share ownership in Germany, 1960–98 (%)
West Germany, 1960–92
Nonﬁnancial Private 
Year Banks Insurers companies households Public Foreign
1960 8.0 3.4 40.7 30.3 12.0 5.6
1965 7.5 3.7 39.3 30.6 10.0 8.9
1970 9.1 4.2 37.4 31.3 9.5 8.5
1975 9.7 4.2 42.1 25.1 8.9 9.9
1980 11.7 4.8 42.8 21.2 8.5 11.1
1985 11.0 5.8 38.8 22.5 7.5 14.4
1990 14.1 7.8 39.0 19.9 4.4 14.8
1992 14.9 9.0 41.4 17.6 3.9 13.2
Uniﬁed Germany, 1990–98
Private 
Investment Nonﬁnancial  (including 
Banks funds Insurers companies organizations) Public Foreign
1990 10.29 4.33 9.81 41.68 17.23 3.71 12.95
1991 10.27 4.84 10.32 41.36 16.65 3.67 12.89
1992 10.23 5.42 10.41 42.90 15.99 3.66 11.40
1993 9.78 7.27 12.22 38.72 16.66 3.17 12.18
1994 9.40 7.57 11.82 40.87 15.76 3.53 11.04
1995 10.12 7.45 10.93 41.46 15.35 4.39 10.30
1996 11.05 8.96 10.79 37.54 16.00 3.75 11.91
1997 10.93 11.28 14.50 30.46 16.61 2.86 13.35
1998 10.32 12.94 13.74 30.50 14.96 1.91 15.64
Source: Adapted from Ernst (2001, p. 18, table 2) and Ernst (2001, p. 19, table 3), citing Deutsches Ak-
tieninstitut (1996, S. FB_08.1-2f), Deutsche Bundesbank (1976), and for 1990–98 (uniﬁed Germany)
Deutsche Bundesbank (1999, S. 105).linkages.7 This tendency then led to delistings and illiquid capital markets
as companies held on to sizable equity stakes in order to establish long-
term relationships. Attempts at revitalizing the stock markets in Germany
began to some extent in the 1980s and seemed to have some success by the
1990s. But the bursting of the new economy bubble within a decade eﬀec-
tively reversed the positive trend, and the future prospects as of 2005 re-
main uncertain.
Clearly, the deconcentration eﬀorts of the allies in the early aftermath of
World War II—in terms both of equity ownership and of industrial or-
ganization—failed generally over the long run. The capital stock concen-
tration of the AGs was higher than it had been before WWII, though other
organizational forms, especially personal enterprises, retained their im-
portance and position in the postwar economy. In 1950, the average AG
was bigger (average nominal capital in 1925 was 1.5 million RM; in 1957 it
was 10.3 million RM) and employed more people (1925: 307, 1950: 790)
than in former times, but the share of AGs of all German companies stayed
almost the same. For every thousand companies in 1950, just one took the
AG form. In the same year, over 90 percent of all companies—including
unincorporated ﬁrms—were owned by one or only a few owners (Pross
1965, p. 53).8
The ongoing concentration process in post–World War II Germany
emerged most prominently among the large, listed AGs. Among these
ﬁrms, concentration increased from the 1960s to the 1980s, and family
domination simultaneously declined (Iber 1985). Despite their loosening
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Table 4.3 Ownership structure for the 100 largest German companies, 1988–98
Majority owner 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
Other top-100 company 120010
Foreign investors 16 17 16 18 14 17
Public 13 8 11 13 13 13
Single investors, families, 
endowments 21 23 19 17 19 18
Other 345559
Companies with majority 
ownership 54 54 51 53 52 57
More than 50% dispersed 
ownership 28 30 29 29 27 22
No majority 18 16 20 18 21 21
Companies without 
majority owner 46 46 49 47 48 43
Source: Adapted from Brickwell (2001, p. 52, table 3.8).
7. See also Iber (1985) and monthly reports by the Bundesbank over the period.
8. Unfortunately, Pross does not give exact numbers.of ties, families and individuals remained important shareholders. Be-
tween 1963 and 1983, the percentage as measured by number and nominal
capital of corporations with majority shareholders increased at both the 50
percent and 75 percent thresholds. This concentration process slowed
somewhat toward the end of the period and appears to have begun to move
in the opposite direction at the end of the twentieth century.
Still, ownership remains relatively concentrated in Germany, and fami-
lies take prominent roles, particularly for nonﬁnancial ﬁrms, unlisted com-
panies, and smaller ﬁrms generally.9Nonﬁnancial ﬁrms also take a primary
role as block holders, and one can see a shift in the importance from fami-
lies as dominant shareholders to enterprises and banks starting by the ’60s
and ’70s (ﬁgure 4.4). There is also strong evidence that controlling owners
tend to be solitary.10
A look at today’s ﬁrms shows the persistence of family ownership in Ger-
many and the impact it has had on accumulated wealth. Seventeen of the
twenty-one biggest German private fortunes (more than three billion DM
in the 1990s) derive from family-founded enterprises (Joly 1998, p. 29).11Of
the 274,139 enterprises with more than two million DM business volume
The History of Corporate Ownership and Control in Germany 235
Fig. 4.4 Ownership of German corporate equity
9. See Faccio and Lang (2002) for comparisons across countries and Klein and Blondel
(2002) for in-depth evidence on Germany in particular (with comparisons to a parallel French
study).
10. See Faccio and Lang (2002) or Becht and Boehmer (2003).
11. Joly unfortunately does not indicate whether these fortunes derive from family enter-
prise foundations of the pre- or post-WWII period.in 1995, 3.1 percent were founded before 1870, and 12 percent between
1871 and 1913.12 In the ﬁrst group, 74.5 percent are still family enterprises,
and in the second group, 72.1 percent are family owned. Thus, among pre-
WWI survivors, family ownership is key. Families did lose some impor-
tance in corporate ownership after the Second World War, but they remain
a signiﬁcant force. Despite the decline in ownership by households gener-
ally, families or individuals are often dominant shareholders. That is, fam-
ilies are central to the ownership of many ﬁrms, but equity ownership is un-
usual among the population at large.
A large number of German corporations consistently have average own-
ership blocks well in excess of 50 percent, even in corporations listed on the
stock exchange. Blocks tend to be higher in smaller and unlisted ﬁrms. But
even in large and listed companies, large shareholdings are a common fea-
ture (see ﬁgure 4.5).13 These stakes are probably held for control purposes,
as stakes are clustered around important control thresholds of 25, 50, and
75 percent (Becht and Boehmer 2003). Because of the right to veto certain
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Fig. 4.5 Family and nonfamily ﬁrms by period of foundation
Source: Klein (2000).
12. It is assumed that during this period, apart from cooperatives (Genossenschaften),
nearly all enterprises were founded as (potential) family enterprises. Evidence comes from the
many personal enterprises cited in Klein (2000), p. 33.
13. See the evidence in Becht and Boehmer (2003), Faccio and Lang (2002), Iber (1985),
Klein and Blondel (2002), Köke (2001, 2003), and Lehmann and Weigand (2000).decisions, the 25 percent (blocking minority) and 75 percent thresholds are
crucial. In more than 80 percent of sampled companies, at least one share-
holder held a blocking minority in the years examined. Concentration also
increased during that period—all the more striking given the sampling of
large, listed ﬁrms, where one would expect greater ownership dispersion
(Iber 1985).
The estimates of the prevalence of pyramids vary across studies: Köke
(2002) ﬁnds that about half of the ﬁrms in his sample are controlled
through pyramids, while, for example, Gorton and Schmid (2000) ﬁnd
much smaller numbers. Faccio and Lang (2002) also ﬁnd that ﬁnancial
ﬁrms use pyramids to exert control much more often than did private
households. These studies cover varying time periods and samples, making
it diﬃcult to draw conclusions about the trends in the use of pyramids in
German corporate governance. It does appear, however, that the use of
pyramids has been far more common and extensive in the last few decades
of the twentieth century than it was before.
Overall, the patterns of corporate ownership suggest that, while owner-
ship dispersion progressed as expected up to the Nazi era, the tendencies
appeared to reverse from there up to the 1980s. Still, the most recent ﬁg-
ures suggest a possible return to a pattern of gradual diﬀusion of owner-
ship. Thus, it may turn out that future economists will look back at the mid-
twentieth century as an aberration, rather than as a permanent trend away
from the previous situation.
4.2.2 The Role of Banks in Corporate Ownership
It is diﬃcult to talk about corporate ownership in Germany without
dealing with the issue of control rights. Due to the phenomenon of proxy
voting, the ability of those with ownership rights to cede their control
rights to others, equity ownership is often separated from direct control;
likewise, many institutions that exercise control over nonﬁnancial ﬁrms
have no ownership rights over the resulting revenue streams. Owners of
German corporations very often turn over control rights to ﬁnancial insti-
tutions in the form of proxy voting rights. Such proxy control over voting
rights grants banks direct participation in the selection of ﬁrm supervisory
board members and therefore indirect control over the choice of top man-
agement. Banks may actively pursue close and long-term relationships
with their client ﬁrms through direct connections with existing ﬁrm man-
agers and supervisory board members. They forge these formal links with
nonﬁnancial ﬁrms by gaining representation on ﬁrm supervisory boards
(Aufsichtsräte) as well as through interlocking directorates more generally.
Historical Debates over the Role of Banks
Jeidels (1905) claims that “the power of the Great Banks is exercised via
the legal institution of the supervisory board, rather than through direct
The History of Corporate Ownership and Control in Germany 237inﬂuence of ﬁnancial strength” (p. 145, my translation).14 Gerschenkron
(1962) echoes Jeidels, saying that “through development of the institution
of the supervisory boards to the position of most powerful organs within
corporate organizations, the banks acquired a formidable degree of ascen-
dancy over industrial enterprises, which extended far beyond the sphere of
ﬁnancial control into that of entrepreneurial and managerial decisions.”15
According to these standard accounts, bank seats on supervisory boards
permit not just oversight, but also direct control over ﬁrms’ strategic deci-
sions. Such involvement arguably reduces uncertainty about borrowers,
mitigates risks of moral hazard or simple bad judgment, and facilitates
long-term lending through rolled-over current account credits.16From this
perspective, formal relationships also make bankers willing to help ﬁrms
solve idiosyncratic diﬃculties and ride out general downturns. Felden-
kirchen (1991, p. 127) gives the example of Hoerder Bergwerks-und Hütten-
verein, which, due to what Feldenkirchen argues was an exclusive relation-
ship with the Schaaﬀhausen’schen Bankverein (and the private banker
Deichmann & Co.), received crucial restructuring and survived a brush
with bankruptcy. There are as well negative interpretations of bank con-
trol, in which the universal banks are seen to have exploited their positions
of power to manipulate industrial ﬁrms to the banks’ advantage.17 At the
same time, however, researchers have uncovered convincing ﬁrm-level evi-
dence against the bank-power hypothesis for the prewar period.18
Evidence on Bank Ownership before World War I
While there is no deﬁnitive, general evidence on ownership structure for
the pre–World War I period, ownership of nonﬁnancial ﬁrms by universal
banks can be examined. A prevalent notion in the literature on German
corporate ﬁnance is that universal banks hold signiﬁcant equity stakes in
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14. The Great Banks were the nine largest of the universal banks: Bank für Handel und In-
dustrie, Berliner Handelsgesellschaft, Commerz- und Discontobank, Deutsche Bank, Dis-
contogesellschaft, Dresdner Bank, Mitteldeutsche Creditbank, Nationalbank für Deutsch-
land, and A. Schaaﬀhausen’scheur Bankverein.
15. Wallich (1905), Riesser (1910), Schumpeter (1930), Whale (1930), Chandler (1990),
Tilly (1994), Calomiris (1995), and most others writing on the subject also emphasize this
point.
16. See Lavington (1921), Schumpeter (1930), Gerschenkron (1962, 1968), Kennedy
(1987), and, in the modern context, Mayer (1988). On current account lending, see the dis-
cussion in Pollard and Ziegler (1992), p. 21.
17. Hilferding (1910), a known socialist critic, energetically promoted such an idea. See also
Tilly (1994), p. 4, citing also Cameron (1961), Levy-Leboyer (1964), Tilly (1966), März (1968),
Kocka (1978), and Pohl (1982). See also Feldenkirchen (1979) and Kunze (1926).
18. See Wellhöner (1989), pp. 83–87, who, for example, shows that the bank representatives
on Phoenix’s board, yielding to pressure from other ﬁrms in the Steelworks Association, acted
as a lever for Phoenix competitors with the powerful industrialist Thyssen in the lead. Wessel
(1990) and Wengenroth (1992) also support the idea that bank power was waning (at least in
the steel industry) and that large ﬁrms were mostly independent of the universal banks, well
before 1900.ﬁrms and use these positions to exert inﬂuence over the ﬁrms’ decisions.
This idea has persisted for at least a century, probably from the second half
of the nineteenth century. The long-term holding of equities—indeed, any-
thing held at the closing of a ﬁscal year—will appear in the balance sheets
of banks. The size and variety of such holdings oﬀer one way to assess their
importance relative to the other activities of the banks and to the economy
as a whole.
Although reporting laws were weak and vague in the pre–World War I
era, banks did book their securities holdings if they existed. Naturally,
there are reporting problems, and, according to such contemporaries as
the banker Jacob Riesser, banks did undervalue their securities in their ﬁ-
nancial statements. Underreporting is most severe for industrial securities,
since the banks feared that investors would view large holdings of non-
ﬁnancial shares as a signal of poor bank performance. Riesser (1911) ex-
plains that
excessive holdings of securities will be interpreted to mean either that the
times have not been propitious for the issue business of the bank, or that
it maintains excessive speculative engagements, or that it is involved to
an excessive extent in speculative transactions on its own account . . . or,
ﬁnally, that it has been unable to ﬁnd suﬃciently proﬁtable employment
for its funds. It is for these reasons that a large proportion of the writing
oﬀ done by the banks occurs under the head of securities account. (pp.
402–403)
Thus, bank-held equity stakes are probably undervalued relative to
other ﬁnancial assets in their balance sheets, and the extent of the misre-
porting is uncertain. The very fact that banks attempted to downplay their
stock holdings, along with Riesser’s contention that investors frowned
upon signiﬁcant stake holding, suggests that the banks did not pursue eq-
uity holdings as part of an active policy of direct control of nonﬁnancial
enterprises. At least from the 1880s until World War I, banks seem to have
avoided holding large proportions of nongovernment securities over the
long term.
Corporate securities make up a small proportion of universal bank as-
sets. For the great banks, the holdings varied between 7 and 8 percent of
assets but did trend upward toward the end of the period.19 For the whole
period, the nongovernment equity holdings of the great banks never ex-
ceeded 11 percent (see ﬁgure 4.6). The denominators of these series are
computed in real terms, since securities tended to be posted at book values.
Loans and cash assets turn over frequently within any year and therefore
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19. Banks often held signiﬁcant amounts of government securities as reserves. Because
these assets are unrelated to industrial ﬁnance, it is important to compare securities net of
government issues. Data sources aggregate government and nongovernment securities until
1912, so the ﬁgures for the years before that are estimated. See Fohlin (2006) for details and
additional results.increase or decrease in nominal value along with the general price level.
Thus, as other assets inﬂate (deﬂate), the apparent proportion of securities
to total assets would decline (increase). The low levels of equity holdings
are surprising, especially considering the average contribution of the secu-
rities business to the overall revenues of the universal banks.
Because these ﬁgures aggregate all nongovernment securities holdings,
they include many stakes that the banks did not intentionally take as part
of their investment strategy. In fact, a signiﬁcant portion of the total in-
vestments by universal banks arose out of their involvement in underwrit-
ing consortia (or syndicates). Therefore, some shares remained on the
banks’ books only because the banks did not place the shares or due to the
fact that the underwriting process crossed into the next business year (see
ﬁgures 4.7 and 4.8). The subset of nongovernment securities not held as a
result of underwriting syndicates thus gives an approximation of the pro-
portion of assets that universal banks may have held as nongovernment se-
curities, had the universal banks been organized more like specialized
commercial banks.20
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Fig. 4.6 Securities as a share of real total bank assets, 1884–1913
Source: Fohlin (2006).
20. Nonsyndicate securities were estimated using a method similar to that described for
nongovernment securities. See Fohlin (2005) for further details.Consortium-related holdings by the great banks increased steadily
throughout the boom in joint-stock founding of the late 1890s and reached
a prewar peak in the years just after the stock market crisis of 1900–1901.21
Decline continued as the market improved, and holdings increased slightly
after the 1907 stock market crisis. In 1909, syndicate securities holdings
reached their lowest point in the twenty-ﬁve years of available data.22
Smaller banks and provincial banks held even fewer total equity stakes
than their Berlin-based counterparts throughout the period, and the
provincial banks steadily lowered those holdings, relative to their other as-
sets, from the early 1890s until sometime around 1905. Relative to other as-
sets, the provincial banks also held far smaller proportions of syndicate
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21. The rapid increase in joint-stock share capital following 1901 stemmed from an increase
in the average nominal share capital of ﬁrms, while the upward trend of the 1890s related pri-
marily to a rising number of companies.
22. In the run-up to World War I, universal banks markedly increased their holdings of syn-
dicate securities. After the onset of the war, the great banks’ syndicate holdings declined dra-
matically as a share of bank assets—from 8 percent in 1914 to 3 percent in 1919. Perhaps con-
trary to intuition, the decline is not primarily accounted for by crowding out by government
securities. Government securities holdings did increase in the early years of the war, but all se-
curities holdings declined steadily after the war.
Fig. 4.7 Securities as a share of real total bank assets, provincial banks, 
1884–1913
Source: Fohlin (2006).securities than did the great banks. Only in the couple of years before
World War I did the smaller banks substantially raise their syndicate hold-
ings, though it is impossible to say from aggregate data whether the in-
crease stemmed from greater participation in underwriting or simply less
success in placing underwritten securities. Much of the diﬀerence likely
stems from the proximity of the largest universal banks to the major secu-
rities markets (particularly Berlin) and the relatively stronger involvement
of the great banks in large, more diﬀusely held ﬁrms. The fact that syndi-
cate holdings crowded out other types of equity holdings suggests that the
corporate relationships of the great banks via equity stakes were often
nonexclusive. By deﬁnition, the consortium holdings represented partici-
pation within a larger group of banks. So, while the great banks likely en-
gaged in long-term relationships with many of the ﬁrms whose shares they
helped issue through syndicate participations, those relationships were
clearly multilateral.
The data so far also do not reveal anything about the magnitude or du-
ration of individual relationships, since aggregate ﬁgures provide no clue
to the identity of the ﬁrms, the value of shares, or the length of their inclu-
sion in a bank portfolio. To gain this sort of insight, we would need to look
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Fig. 4.8 Securities as a share of real total bank assets, great banks, 1884–1913
Source: Fohlin (2006).at the portfolios of individual banks, and those data are sparse and incom-
plete. When we patch together the available data on two of the largest
Berlin banks, interesting patterns emerge. Between 1852 and 1900, Dis-
contogesellschaft (DG) reported total equity holdings of between zero and
35 percent of assets. While the bank’s holdings ﬂuctuated markedly
throughout the last half of the nineteenth century, the proportion of secu-
rities followed a generally downward trend toward the end of the period.
From its founding in 1852 through 1855, DG held no securities among its
assets. Thereafter, the bank acquired substantial interest in securities, but
a quantitative breakdown of securities 1856 to 1865 indicates that two min-
ing companies accounted for the major share of DG’s industrial holdings.
Shares in the two ﬁrms, Heinrichshütte and Bleialf, amounted to around
11 percent of assets for most of the period in which the bank held the
shares.
Däbritz (1931) provides an account of the bank’s involvement with these
ﬁrms and indicates that such direct participation arose out of the bank’s
abortive plan to convert the ﬁrms into joint-stock companies. In one case,
the bank bought an iron mining company in 1857 and invested heavily in
the expansion of production capacity, but the ﬁrm immediately faced rap-
idly falling iron prices and proﬁts. During the several years of low returns
the bank’s shareholders constantly criticized management for the misstep
(Däbritz, p. 105). The other two ﬁrms presented similar problems for DG,
and the bank was forced to hold their shares until they could extricate
themselves in the more favorable market of the late 1860s and early 1870s.
Other than these three companies, the bank’s holdings of industry stocks
amounted to between zero and 3 percent of its assets for the years in which
disaggregated data are available (1852–65). Thus, it can hardly be argued
that even the early activities of the great banks involved extensive, direct in-
volvement in industrial companies.
Although the disaggregated data for DG run out before the second wave
of the German industrialization hit its peak, the story can be picked up in
the 1880s using evidence from another of the great banks. Darmstädter
Bank (BHI) published unusually detailed accounts of its securities hold-
ings, and Saling’s reproduced the information in its series on Berlin-listed
companies.23 It is clear from the available data that holdings of industrial
shares amounted to less than 1 percent of BHI’s assets for most of the
1880s and ’90s and that, even at its peak, the ratio of industrial shares to
assets only reached 1.3 percent, in 1882. Including railway and real estate
shares, the total of nonbank equity shares probably reached only 4 percent
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23. Unfortunately, Saling’s only began publishing in 1876, and the volumes before 1882 are
scarce. Also unfortunate for this analysis, they stopped publishing details of securities hold-
ings in 1899.of assets. When bank shares are included, the total rises to no more than
6.5 percent. It should be underscored that the earlier numbers are esti-
mated based on the ratio of industrial shares to total securities for the pe-
riod in which both types of data are reported (1896 and 1897). The pro-
portion of assets held in industrial, railway, or bank shares for those years
peaked at 3.7 percent. Thus, only if BHI held a signiﬁcantly greater part of
its securities in the form of bank shares in the 1880s than in the 1890s (un-
likely, given that the concentration of banking accelerated in the 1890s)
would 6.5 percent be an underestimate. These data provide further support
for the notion that the great banks invested a relatively small portion of
their portfolios in the equity of industrial ﬁrms.
Bank Stake Holding in the Postwar Era
Given the often heated discussion about bank power and inﬂuence in
Germany, the available evidence on banks’ equity stakes is surprising:
along with the state, ﬁnancial enterprises hold the fewest large share-
blocks in manufacturing ﬁrms.24 Franks and Mayer (2001) report similar
results for a sample of 171 large industrial companies in 1990—neither
banks nor insurance companies held a stake of 50 percent or more in any
of these companies. Moreover, only in 5.8 percent of all cases did a bank
hold a stake that was both larger than 25 percent and at the same time the
largest stake in the respective companies. For insurance companies, this
ﬁgure drops to 1.8 percent, compared with 20.5 percent for family groups
and 27.5 percent for domestic (German) companies.25
According to Brickwell (2001), in the 1980s and ’90s, banks and insur-
ance companies only owned stakes larger than 5 percent in those compa-
nies from the “Top 100” that did not have a majority stakeholder. There
were forty-three companies that fell into this category in 1998 (table 4.3),
and banks and insurance companies held stakes in twenty-eight of those
(65 percent). In 1980, banks and insurance companies held stakes in 23 of
the 100 major companies. This ﬁgure rose to 35 in 1996, before falling back
to 25 in 2000. Nearly 90 percent of those investments in equity stakes are
made for the long run, with one-third being older than twenty years. Fi-
nally, approximately 85 percent of all investments in the “Top 100” are
stakes between 5 and 25 percent, and holdings larger than 25 percent have
been scaled back since the mid-1980s (table 4.4). In 1990, the thirty main
banking institutions—the ten largest private banks, the public banks, and
credit cooperatives—held a total of 202 direct stakes (172 ﬁrms) and 276
indirect stakes (236 ﬁrms) among all capital companies (AG and GmbH
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24. Data are from Köke (2001). See Adams (1994, 1999), Baums and Fraune (1995), and
Kaserer and Wenger (1998) on the power of banks.
25. Yet Santucci (2002, p. 513) asserts: “In sum, due to their unique position as equity hold-
ers, banks and ﬁnancial institutions are in a position to substantially control German com-
panies.”form; Haas 1994, pp. 32–33). Averaged over the thirty banks, this sum
amounts to fewer than sixteen stakes (fourteen ﬁrms) per bank. Moreover,
the aﬀected ﬁrms represent a small portion of the overall population of
ﬁrms, since there were 2,682 AGs and 433,731 GmbHs in Germany at the
time (Haas, p. 38).26 From this study, one can also see that banks have held
a handful of majority stakes, but only in smaller companies: 21.1 percent
of all stakes of these thirty banks were larger than 50 percent, while nearly
13 percent were higher than 75 percent, but the target companies were not
the large, listed share corporations (Haas, pp. 32–33).
The current level of bank shareholdings in nonﬁnancial ﬁrms remains
comparatively low. In 2002, the German government abolished capital
gains taxes in a widely publicized eﬀort to encourage banks to divest them-
selves of equity stakes. Given the lack of major holdings, it should come as
no surprise that banks have not sold large amounts of shares. More
broadly, the trend toward disentangling the dense business webs in Ger-
many began before the tax changes took eﬀect. Wójcik (2001), for example,
ﬁnds that ownership became more dispersed between 1997 and 2001. At
the same time, ﬁrms started to dissolve cross-holdings, and ﬁnancial insti-
tutions reduced their block holdings. The decline of bank involvement ap-
pears particularly pronounced compared to that of individuals and fami-
lies as well as nonﬁnancial corporations (Wójcik, p. 15).27
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Table 4.4 Shareholder structure by type and legal form: Largest share block (%)
GmbH Nonlisted AG Listed AG Weighted averagea
1 Dispersed shares (%) 14.75 19.21 37.70 20.65
2 Individuals (%) 2.83 11.78 10.60 6.39
3 Nonﬁnancial ﬁrms (%) 67.92 58.81 41.18 60.25
4 State (%) 2.80 1.59 0.83 2.13
5 Financial enterprises (%) 0.18 0.42 3.81 0.98
6 Foreigners (%) 11.53 8.19 5.88 9.61
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
No. of observationsb 3,357 1,197 1,207 5,788
Source: Köke (2001, p. 276 table).
Notes:Typerefers to the largest shareholder that is classiﬁed as having voting power using the
Cubbin and Leech index. All ﬁrms with no large shareholder (just dispersed shares) or those
having no large shareholder with voting power using the Cubbin and Leech index are classi-
ﬁed as dispersed.
aIncluding KGaA.
bThe KGaA is not reported here as a separate category because the number of observations
is only 27.
26. The aﬀected ﬁrms represent 3.62 percent of all AGs and KGaAs and 0.06 percent of all
GmbHs. Since there are other banks not considered in the sample, the total proportion of
companies with bank-held stakes is likely somewhat higher.
27. See also Beyer (2002), who ﬁnds similar patterns.A look at the latest annual reports of the leading German banks con-
ﬁrms this general notion: even though all banks have myriad stakes in
other, often unrelated companies, these are rarely signiﬁcant, and overall
the participation makes up much less than 5 percent of respective assets. In
1998, the ratios of stakes (market value) to total assets were 4.20 percent
for Dresdner Bank, 3.92 percent for Deutsche Bank, 2.65 percent for Hypo-
Vereinsbank, and 0.49 percent for Commerzbank (Brickwell 2001, table
3.9).28 The ﬁgures on equity shareholding for the last few decades mirror
those of the largest banks a century ago. Taken together, the empirical ev-
idence seriously undermines the claim that big ﬁnance currently runs Ger-
many’s economy via its equity stakes. Contrary to commonly held beliefs,
and excepting an active presence in a few ﬁrms, banks tend not to hold
dominant stakes. Thus, the domination of corporate ownership by banks
is just as much a myth for present-day Germany as it was for the industri-
alization period.29
4.2.3 Patterns of Corporate Control
The available evidence on corporate ownership suggests that bank
stakes in German ﬁrms are generally small and have been signiﬁcant only
during unusual episodes. The scant evidence available for the pre–World
War I period indicates that ﬁrms did not own large stakes in other ﬁrms,
but such stakes are quite common in recent experience. With or without
ownership stakes, banks and ﬁrms may still wield substantial control over
corporations, either through proxy voting of shares or through seats on su-
pervisory boards (Aufsichtrat).
Interlocking Directorates
Evidence on Interlocking Directorates before World War I. As with the idea
of bank equity stakes, the practice of interlocking directorates—the place-
ment of individuals on multiple boards of directors—has always played
a prominent role in the historical accounts of the German industrializa-
tion. The institution arose to a substantial extent in the last quarter of the
nineteenth century. Before mid-century, when few share companies ex-
isted, there were too few ﬁrms with formal boards of directors to permit
substantial interlocking. As restrictions on chartering stock companies
relaxed around 1870, however, and after the 1884 promulgation of regu-
lations requiring stock companies to form supervisory boards, the
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28. These are the four leading banks in Germany.
29. There is some evidence, however, that banks largely control themselves through cross-
shareholdings and have thus eﬀectively managed to shield themselves from outside inﬂu-
ences. See Brickwell (2001), pp. 60–65 and Adams (1994), p. 151. See also Boehmer (2000),
p. 117 for a critical view on the role of banks in corporate takeovers; Jenkinson and
Ljungqvist (2001), pp. 430–31, for a more favorable view of banks aiding nonﬁnancial ﬁrms
in equity stakebuilding; and Köke (2002) for related arguments and a more extensive discus-
sion of block trading in Germany.foundation was set for formalized relations among ﬁrms and between
banks and ﬁrms.
Using data on share companies listed on the Berlin stock exchange,
Fohlin (1999b) shows that German corporate governance forms changed
considerably during the German industrialization period—particularly
during the last twenty years of the nineteenth century. The data demon-
strate marked growth in the formalized interaction between banks and in-
dustrial ﬁrms between 1882 and 1898, indicating that interlocking direc-
torates grew along with industrial enterprises and became widespread
among Berlin-listed companies only during the last stages of industrializa-
tion. These interactions involved many third-party relationships, in which
one individual sat on the supervisory board of both a bank and a ﬁrm. The
placement of bank directors on industrial ﬁrm supervisory boards was
considerably less common and likely did not grow substantially over the
period.
The historical evidence shows that some of the apparent relationships
between banks and ﬁrms may have been merely coincidental, suggesting
the importance of interlocking directorates between and among nonﬁnan-
cial ﬁrms. Indeed, over half of joint-stock ﬁrms in existence in 1904 had at
least one board member (either supervisory or executive) in common with
a Berlin-listed nonﬁnancial ﬁrm.30 Nearly 22 percent of these ﬁrm-linked
companies had no board interlocks, either direct or indirect, with a bank,
and one-third had no banker sitting on their supervisory boards. Of those
with bankers on their boards, almost half had only a private banker—not
one of the joint-stock universal banks. In other words, the practice of in-
terlocking directorates extended well beyond the placement of bank direc-
tors on company supervisory boards. Many ﬁrms intertwined their gov-
ernance structures with one another, making the involvement of the
universal banks just one part of an overall system of shared corporate gov-
ernance.
Table 4.5 gives a breakdown of the various types of board relationships
in a group of nonﬁnancial share companies from 1895 to 1912, the subset
of the industrialization period in which formal banking relationships were
most widespread. Even in this later part of industrialization, only two-
thirds of the sampled ﬁrms fall into the attached category, combining all
types of bank relationships.31 Closer to half of the ﬁrms had a bank direc-
tor sitting on their supervisory boards, and 40 percent of these positions
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30. See Fohlin (1997). The ﬁrms were randomly sampled from all joint-stock ﬁrms in exis-
tence in 1904, and their supervisory board members were compared with a list of all board
members of all Berlin-listed corporations (Adressbuch der Direktoren und Aufsichtsratmit-
glieder).
31. The three main types are bank director on ﬁrm supervisory board, ﬁrm director on
bank supervisory board, and concurrent membership of one person in both a bank and ﬁrm
supervisory board. Occasionally, we see a fourth type, in which one individual sits concur-
rently in the directorates of a bank and a ﬁrm.(19 percent of the sample overall) were held solely by private bankers. A
similar number of ﬁrms had provincial bank directors, and no other
bankers, on their supervisory boards. Only 12 percent of joint-stock ﬁrms
received representation from a great bank—one of the top nine banks—
and that number is even smaller among the top four banks, the so-called
D-banks: Deutsche, Dresdner, Darmstädter, and Disconto. In his 1911
treatise on the German universal banks, Jacob Riesser gave a list of all
joint-stock companies with great bank directors on their boards. That list
contained 171 industrial ﬁrms (that is, not counting railroads and com-
merce), which would have amounted to less than 5 percent of all joint stock
ﬁrms in the relevant sectors.
The numbers decline further when considering bank control of the lead-
ing positions in nonﬁnancial ﬁrm supervisory boards. The chair (Vorsitzen-
der) and vice-chair (stellvertretender Vorsitzender) of the supervisory board
typically maintained the most control over the policy agenda of a ﬁrm.
Thus, a banker in such a post might have wielded more power than he could
as an ordinary member. Table 4.6 tabulates the frequency of such positions
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Table 4.5 Interlocking directorates by type, 1895–1912
Variable Deﬁnition Number Mean (%)
ATT Any type of attachment 3,347 67.07
V2AR Bank director sits on ﬁrm supervisory board 2,684 52.56
GBV2AR Great bank director sits on ﬁrm supervisory board 612 11.98
ARAR Joint member of bank and ﬁrm supervisory boards 2,268 44.41
ARARonly Joint supervisory board member; no V2AR 584 11.40
AR2V Firm director sits on a bank supervisory board 265 5.19
V2V Firm director is also bank director 107 2.10
Source: Fohlin (2005).
Note: There are 5,107 observations (ﬁrm-years).
Table 4.6 Firms with bank directors as supervisory board chair or vice-chair
Chair Vice-chair Chair or vice-chair
Bank chair 
or vice-chair 
(% of ﬁrms 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent with V2AR)
No bank 5,050 86.31 5,258 89.86 4,582 78.31
Private bank 253 4.32 178 3.04 410 7.01 36.5
Provincial bank 414 7.08 264 4.51 603 10.31 48.3
Great bank 48 0.82 54 0.92 100 1.71 25.9
Provincial and 
great bank 86 1.47 97 1.66 156 2.67 49.6
Total 5,851 100 5,851 100 5,851 100
Source: Fohlin (2005).in the current sample and indicates that less than 22 percent of ﬁrms had a
bank director as chair or vice-chair of their supervisory boards. That ﬁgure
drops to less than 14 percent of ﬁrms when considering only chairmanships.
In other words, in fewer than half of the cases in which a banker sat on a ﬁrm
supervisory board was the banker in one of the top two posts. The provin-
cial banks naturally held the most chair- or vice-chairmanships (10 percent
of the sample), but the private bankers were close behind (7 percent of the
sample). The great banks held relatively few chair or vice-chair positions,
amounting to less than 5 percent of the full sample and less than 2.5 percent
when considering only chairmanships. Compared to the smaller banks, the
great banks were also less likely to hold the top positions among the ﬁrms
on whose boards they sat: 26 percent of board seats for the great banks,
compared with 48 and 37 percent of board seats for provincial and private
bankers, respectively. In the cases of dual provincial and great bank direc-
tors, the ﬁgures fall in line with the provincial banks (50 percent of such
board members were chairs or vice-chairs). Extrapolating to the full popu-
lation of German industrial ﬁrms, these ﬁgures indicate that directors of the
nine great banks chaired the supervisory boards of fewer than 100 German
nonﬁnancial ﬁrms in the last two decades before World War I.
Although historians and contemporaries clearly underscore the perva-
siveness of bank-ﬁrm relationships through interlocking directorates, the
older literature does not explicitly reveal how or why these relationships
emerged. Still, several hypotheses can and have been used to explain the de-
velopment of formalized banking relationships and how these links may
have beneﬁted the German economy during the later stages of industrial-
ization. Most of these hypotheses emphasize the amelioration of informa-
tion problems for banks by screening ﬁrms before providing ﬁnance (ex
ante monitoring), keeping watch over the ﬁrm’s activities and results (in-
terim and ex post monitoring), or aﬃxing a seal of approval to signal in-
vestment-worthiness. Positions on ﬁrm supervisory boards are thought to
have allowed banks access to and inﬂuence over strategic planning and in-
vestment decision making, thus facilitating the transfer of entrepreneurial
expertise to ﬁrms. Theoretically, then, the intervention of bankers leads to
better decisions by ﬁrms and outside investors, less incentive for credit ra-
tioning, and larger potential markets for new securities, especially equity,
issues.32
The evidence on bank board seats clearly shows that ﬁrm characteristics
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32. See Aoki (1988) on various types of monitoring and Diamond (1984) for a theoretical
model of delegated monitoring. On credit rationing, see Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). In the
framework of asymmetric information theory, all bank relationships are essentially the same;
there is no a priori reason to assume that smaller, provincial universal banks resolve infor-
mation problems better or worse than their Berlin counterparts. But since the data allow
diﬀerentiation among the types of banks represented on ﬁrm boards, Fohlin (2006) uses a cat-
egorical variable to investigate possible systematic diﬀerences among private bank, provincial
bank, great bank, and joint provincial and great bank attachments.vary markedly depending on the type of bank considered.33This ﬁnding, in
itself, indicates a lack of generality of the hypotheses laid out. Diﬀerences
in bank size and location help determine relationships with industrial
ﬁrms. Even within speciﬁc bank categories, the results demonstrate little
support for the traditional hypotheses: investment, proﬁts, and income
growth should all positively predict bank board memberships, but in fact
they do not. Among listed ﬁrms, dividend-adjusted stock returns are also
statistically insigniﬁcant.34 The insigniﬁcance of investment and income
growth casts doubt on all three hypotheses, while the results for proﬁtabil-
ity undermine the consultancy hypotheses most speciﬁcally. At least, it is
safe to conclude that, if universal banks were providing advising, their im-
pact in the areas one would consider most important (such as proﬁts) was
small. Certain other variables are signiﬁcant in some cases but not others.
For example, ﬁnancial asset level (normalized by total assets) negatively
predicts board participation by private banks and provincial banks as an-
ticipated but provides no statistical power for great bank or combined at-
tachment. Age, also expected to relate negatively to attachment, is only sig-
niﬁcant and negative for provincial banks.
Debt-equity ratios are more diﬃcult to forecast due to conﬂicting impli-
cations of the hypotheses. Curiously, high levels of debt ﬁnance positively
predict supervisory board membership by a provincial bank or a great
bank, but not for private banks alone. The coeﬃcient of debt-equity ratio
is positive for combined bank aﬃliation, and the level of signiﬁcance only
falls slightly short of 10 percent. Thus, while it is not a strong predictor of
combined attachment, debt ﬁnance is clearly at least a weak factor. Size is
included as a control variable, and it strongly predicts board membership
byall but the provincial banks. Even for provincial bank aﬃliation, size ob-
tains a positive coeﬃcient—but it is statistically weak. It is not surprising
that the largest banks should attract the largest customers, so one would
expect that among attached ﬁrms, the largest ones would aﬃliate with the
great banks and the smaller ones with the provincial banks. It is less clear,
however, that size should be closely tied to attachment in general or at-
tachment to the private banks (in most cases much smaller than their joint-
stock counterparts) in particular.
This ﬁnding does point up the connection between many of the private
bankers appearing on corporate boards and the great banks. As the fore-
runners and often founders of the universal banks, an important subset of
private banks was intimately tied to various joint-stock universal banks.
Some clearly maintained those links, often sitting on incorporated bank
supervisory boards for many years. The most powerful of the private
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33. Fohlin (2006) reports multinomial logit coeﬃcient estimates, where the dependent vari-
able is V2AR—the direct measure of bank attachment.
34. The inclusion of stock returns obviously limits the sample to listed ﬁrms and therefore
reduces the number of observations by about two-thirds to three-quarters.bankers were likely those associated with the largest banks, primarily the
Berlin-centered great banks. Such an explanation for the connection be-
tween size and private bank board memberships therefore hints at the im-
portance of location and prestige, in addition to bank size, in determining
board memberships. So, for example, though private banks on their own
were too small to fully underwrite securities issues for the largest ﬁrms,
they participated in underwriting syndicates with other banks and gained
access to corporate boards in this manner. The ﬁndings on size therefore
lead naturally to the question of stock market listings and the role of uni-
versal banks in the securities markets.
Stock market listing is the only variable that provides consistent and sig-
niﬁcant prediction of board membership for all types of bank aﬃliations,
though the magnitude of the eﬀect varies depending on the type of bank
involved. The probability of the various sorts of bank board membership
diﬀers markedly depending on whether or not a ﬁrm is listed on a stock ex-
change, even controlling for all the other factors that relate to bank rela-
tionships. For example, unattached ﬁrms comprise nearly half (48 percent)
of the overall sample of ﬁrms, but among unlisted ﬁrms that share is 61
percent. After controlling for the other relevant factors, however, the ad-
justed probability of being independent given that the ﬁrm is unlisted is 53
percent. In contrast, listed ﬁrms have a 30 percent adjusted probability of
being unattached, compared to a 26 percent unadjusted probability. These
ﬁgures mean that, even when controlling for other ﬁrm characteristics, the
chance of being unattached is 23 percentage points lower assuming a stock
market listing than not (about a 75 percent reduction in the likelihood of
independent status). In contrast, the probability of attachment rises be-
tween 3 and 9 percentage points, depending on bank type, when a hypo-
thetical ﬁrm changes from unlisted to listed. Given the relatively low like-
lihood of having a great bank on an unlisted ﬁrm’s board (about 9 percent,
controlling for other factors and including those with combined attach-
ment), the increase due to stock market listing represents a doubling of the
probability. In comparison, the adjusted probabilities of private bank or
provincial bank board membership rise less with listing status, but still in-
crease by over one-third (17 to 25 percent for private bank attachment and
20 to 27 percent for provincial bank attachment).
The strong signiﬁcance of listing suggests that bank board memberships
were at least partly related to securities issues and trading. Such an expla-
nation is very plausible for a number of reasons. By the end of the nine-
teenth century, companies wishing to gain admission to a German stock
market were subject to several preliminary requirements, not least of which
was the stipulation that the ﬁrm’s share capital be fully paid up.35 This reg-
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35. See chapter 8 in Fohlin (2006) on the stock markets and their place in the overall cor-
porate ﬁnancial system in Germany.ulation alone likely necessitated the engagement of a universal bank, and,
having underwritten the new securities, that bank would have acquired
some portion of the issued shares, and sometimes more than the bank
could place with investors. Banks often joined forces to underwrite large is-
sues, and larger ﬁrms naturally would have required a greater number of
banks in order to keep each individual stake constant. Under such cir-
cumstances, the ﬁrms with the highest share capitals would be the most
likely to end up with supervisory board representation from multiple
banks.
In addition to their underwriting and placement activities, universal
banks were actively engaged in the brokerage business. The extensive trad-
ing of securities through the banking system likely provided further op-
portunities for banks to hold ﬁrm shares. Furthermore, since the universal
banks maintained extensive networks of commercial clients, retaining a
universal bank may have allowed ﬁrms to reap the beneﬁts of network ex-
ternalities. Bankers not only created their own secondary markets in listed
shares, but they also became fully ensconced in the governing bodies of the
stock exchanges. As the gatekeepers of the German capital market, there-
fore, the universal banks gained easy access to a broad range of securi-
ties—particularly those that were listed.
Finally, it is also possible that ﬁrms made their way into bank networks
because they were already listed or about to become so. Since the Reichs-
bank accepted as collateral only securities listed at a German bourse, such
issues may have been in turn more likely to be accepted as collateral by uni-
versal banks.36A bank may have then exercised inﬂuence in the choice of su-
pervisory board members of the ﬁrms whose shares the bank held as collat-
eral, particularly when shares were owned by small, outside stakeholders.
Modern Patterns of Interlocking Directorates. In the past few decades, de-
bates have continued over the placement of bank employees in the supervi-
sory boards of nonﬁnancial ﬁrms. Some argue that bank employees were
considered able monitors and that it was merely coincidental that bank em-
ployees were appointed to supervisory boards; others claim that banks sent
employees to supervisory boards in order to better monitor their credit en-
gagements and to position themselves to sell additional ﬁnancial services
and perhaps to inﬂuence corporate policy in favor of other companies in
which the bank held a stake.37 Contradicting the more activist theories of
board membership, Hopt (1996a) argues that banks already had any neces-
sary access to customer ﬁnancial information by virtue of disclosure re-
quirements stemming from the credit relationship itself, as well as from par-
ticipation in the ﬁrms. A similar perspective sees these personal linkages as
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36. See Engberg (1981).
37. See Böhm (1992), p. 186.ways to build cooperation among ﬁrms in order to minimize risk and un-
certainty (Schreyögg and Papenheim-Tockhorn 1995, p. 205).38
Twenty years ago, the view predominated that banks actively pursued
board seats in an eﬀort to exert control over corporations in which they were
interested. One study, covering the 1960s and ’70s, found that the banks held
seats (mandates) in all branches of industry and had gradually shifted focus
to mandates in larger corporations by 1978 (Albach and Kless 1982, p. 977).
This move arguably demonstrated a new strategy of quality over quantity:
gaining power in the most important ﬁrms rather than via a large number
of mandates with smaller industry players (Albach and Kless, p. 977).
More generally, board members usually hold only one mandate at a
time, at least among the relatively large German ﬁrms. In a 1989 sample of
492 such companies, having a total of 7,778 members in their management
(2,061) and supervisory (5,717) boards, the vast majority of representatives
(86 percent) had only one mandate.39 Still, there was a substantial share of
representatives who did hold multiple seats and therefore created inter-
locking directorates. Indeed, in this particular sample, 14 percent of the
people holding seats in these ﬁrms accounted for one-third of all mandates
in the companies, and a small handful held upward of ten to twelve seats
apiece (Pfannschmidt 1995).
It also appears that bank relationships last, or they did at least in the
1970s and ’80s. Banks at that time seem to have maintained purposeful and
stable linkages with ﬁrms. For example, out of a sample of 56 of the largest
500 Kapitalgesellschaften in 1987, almost all of the bank board positions
between 1969 and 1988 exceeded personal ties held by one individual bank
employee and appeared to represent intentional moves to build lasting
relationships (Schreyögg and Papenheim-Tockhorn 1995, p. 223).40 Once
again, though, the big-three banks were the main participants in these
partnerships, holding forty-nine out of sixty-six stable linkages maintained
by the top ﬁfteen banks (Schreyögg and Papenheim-Tockhorn, p. 223).
Even among the largest 100 ﬁrms, the proportion of mandates held by
bankers has fallen gradually since the late seventies—from 8.6 percent in
1978 to 6.4 percent in 1996 (Bokelmann 2000). Still, even among these
large companies, the banks held relatively few board seats—never more
than 15 percent of any board (Böhm 1992, pp. 194–95).41 And most banks
do not engage actively in these relationships. Half of the bank-held posi-
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38. Tradition might also explain the reappointment of the same bank to a vacated seat.
39. Pfannschmidt (1995), whose sample includes 492 big German companies as of Decem-
ber 31, 1989 (consisting of the FAZ-list of the hundred biggest companies and companies out
of the Bonner Stichprobe database).
40. Intent is evidenced by the new appointment of individuals from a given bank when a
previous representative from that bank left a ﬁrm’s supervisory board.
41. Size is measured by revenue as of 1986. Half of the mandates are elected by labor, which
automatically halves the number of seats available to bankers. At the same time, this power-
sharing arrangement may lessen the banks’ inﬂuence via the supervisory board seats.tions traced back to just two banks—Deutsche and Dresdner—with
Deutsche holding twice as many as Dresdner.
Banks have also decreased the number of ﬁrms on whose supervisory
boards they sit. In 1986, over two-thirds of the top 100 ﬁrms, and 43 of the
top 50, had bankers on their boards. The Deutsche Bank alone sent repre-
sentatives to 40 of the top 100 (in 1980). By 1990, that ﬁgure was down to
35 ﬁrms, while in 1998, it had dropped to 17 of the top 100 ﬁrms. Deutsche
Bank and Allianz, two of the primary participants in board representation,
have enacted clear plans to dissolve their formerly strong and thick ties
with German companies—Deutsche, in particular, announced in March
2001 that members of the bank would no longer take up supervisory board
chairmanships (Aufsichtsratsvorsitze; Beyer 2002).
If we constrain the pre–World War I sample to the largest ﬁrms—taking
the top 10 percent by total assets, for example—the results are quite simi-
lar to those for the 1990s: approximately one-third to one-half of these
large and mostly listed ﬁrms had one or more of the great banks repre-
sented on their supervisory boards, depending on the year in question.
Thus, it is clear that banks, most noticeably the largest ones, have always
taken an active interest in corporate control, especially of the largest ﬁrms.
The latest swing away from board representation can also be placed in this
much longer perspective and thereby be seen as a historical low point.
Proxy Voting
Direct ownership of shares accounts for only part of the networking
between universal banks and industrial ﬁrms. As the ﬁrst part of this chap-
ter indicates, universal banks owned signiﬁcant stakes in relatively few
ﬁrms—quite clearly a smaller set of ﬁrms than those on whose supervisory
boards they held seats. Bankers must have entered boards by other means,
and one important avenue for such bank access is proxy votes—votes en-
trusted to the bank by the actual owner of the share.
Proxy Voting before WWI. Given their involvement with the placement of
new issues, their provision of safe deposit services, and their lending se-
cured by stocks, the universal banks would have been the logical parties to
take an investor’s proxy votes. Indeed, many investors would have seen
proxy voting by banks as a valuable service. Having acquired voting power
in the general assembly (Generalversammlung), the bank could directly in-
ﬂuence the selection of supervisory board members and thereby indirectly
inﬂuence ﬁrm management and strategy.
Unfortunately, it is diﬃcult to test this hypothesis. As with direct own-
ership data, hardly any data exist on proxy voting in Germany before 1913,
though qualitative evidence and descriptive accounts suggest that it was
common.42 It may be possible to provide additional insight into the matter
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42. Some new eﬀorts are underway and could clarify some of these issues.with the current data, but several assumptions must be made. For example,
if small stakeholders felt less compelled to vote their own shares than did
those with large stakes, then small shareholders would have been more
likely to deposit their shares and turn over their voting rights to a univer-
sal bank. According to this reasoning, closely held ﬁrms—ﬁrms whose cap-
ital was held by a small number of large shareholders—would experience
less proxy voting than would widely held ﬁrms. As a result, the dispersion
of capital ownership would increase the likelihood of accumulation of
board seats by universal bankers.43 The same customers who facilitated
securities issues by a ﬁrm, therefore, may have been the main suppliers of
proxy votes to universal banks.
Based on this reasoning and on data availability, ﬁgures on the number
of shares issued substitute for dispersion of ownership. While it is hardly a
perfect measure of dispersion, the number of shares outstanding does oﬀer
valuable information. For a given share, as the number of shares declines,
the value of each share relative to total capital increases. If shares are indi-
visible, the number of shares outstanding represents the maximum number
of shareholders in a ﬁrm.44 Clearly, it is possible that ﬁrms with large num-
bers of shares were closely held, yet ﬁrms with relatively few shares out-
standing are more likely to have been closely held. In the sample assembled
by Fohlin (2006), share prices fall in a narrow range, regardless of attach-
ment status, and therefore the number of shares issued is highly correlated
with total assets, share capital, and net worth (96 to 98 percent). The stock
of ﬁxed assets is slightly less highly correlated with the number of shares
(90 percent), making it the best available control for ﬁrm size.
The number of shares outstanding is the only variable that strongly pre-
dicts broadly deﬁned bank aﬃliations of all types.45Several other variables
(size, stock market listing, debt-equity ratio, age, and ﬁnancial assets) also
help explain multiple broad attachments. Beyond the industry sector, how-
ever, only number of shares helps predict broad attachment with a single
category of bank (either a provincial or a great bank). The strong, positive
relationship between the number of shares in circulation and broadly de-
ﬁned bank aﬃliation suggests that ownership dispersion is positively asso-
ciated with at least loose involvement in a joint-stock bank network. Given
the limitations on the data, this is the most compelling evidence available
that proxy voting was an important factor in the involvement of ﬁrms in in-
terlocking directorates with banks.
In contrast, the number of shares outstanding provides no strong pre-
The History of Corporate Ownership and Control in Germany 255
43. See Chirinko and Elston (1998), in which the authors show that bank-inﬂuenced ﬁrms
tend to have a more dispersed ownership structure than independent ﬁrms.
44. It may have been possible for several people to own a single share, but I have no evi-
dence for or against such a practice.
45. The models repeat the multinomial logit model of narrow attachment (Fohlin 2005).
Private bankers are considered unattached, since private banks do not generally have super-
visory boards whose members can concurrently sit on ﬁrms’ supervisory boards.dictive power of narrowly deﬁned bank attachment.46Tothe extent that the
number of shares captures the dispersion of capital ownership, the change
in the coeﬃcients from those in the models using the broad deﬁnition of at-
tachment suggests that proxy voting was relatively unimportant for the di-
rect involvement of bank directors in supervisory boards. A hypothesis
that can explain why the number of ﬁrm shares is a strong, positive indica-
tor of broadly deﬁned aﬃliation but is of no predictive value for narrowly
deﬁned attachment runs as follows. Bankers would have sought the closest
oversight of ﬁrms in which the bank invested directly. Membership by bank
directors on ﬁrm supervisory boards therefore may have stemmed from
bank holding of a ﬁrm’s securities or debt. Given the physical limits on a
bank director’s ability to monitor them, ﬁrms in which a bank held proxy
votes but minimal securities or debt may have reasonably fallen to a lower
priority for bank oversight. Proxy votes, therefore, may have simply repre-
sented a means by which banks could vote into oﬃce bank-friendly super-
visory board members—in particular, individuals who already sat on their
own supervisory boards or whom they might know from other business
dealings. Clearly, these arguments about proxy voting and ownership
structure are largely hypothetical. All that can be said from the analysis is
that the importance of proxy voting cannot be rejected on the basis of the
currently available data. It is unlikely that we will deﬁnitively resolve the
uncertainty about the historical importance of proxy voting.47
Modern Patterns of Proxy Voting. The representation of banks on supervi-
sory boards relates closely to the voting of ownership shares in these ﬁrms.
Available ﬁgures on the voters present at annual shareholder meetings sug-
gest that shareholders do not exercise the right to vote their shares. The at-
tendance of small shareholders is extremely low, and rates decreased, at
least at the largest German ﬁrms, from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s.48
As they were in the pre–World War I era, these small share owners are still
often represented via proxy votes turned over to institutions, largely banks.
Data on proxy voting by banks continue to elude researchers, since there is
no central database about general annual meetings. The list of participants
(Teilnehmerverzeichnisse) is required to be recorded only in the commercial
256 Caroline Fohlin
46. Number of shares is signiﬁcant in the narrow attachment logit model only when sector
controls are excluded, clustering is not assumed, and normal (as opposed to robust) standard
errors are used. Number of shares is also positive and signiﬁcant in a panel probit model com-
paring all attached ﬁrms to independents, but the estimation technique appears to be rather
unstable. In particular, diﬀerent assumptions on the model provide signiﬁcantly diﬀerent re-
sults. Thus, the coeﬃcients of such a model should be viewed with caution.
47. Despite some new eﬀorts to gather proxy voting data, I remain pessimistic about the
possibility of ﬁnding suﬃcient data to statistically test the proxy voting hypothesis in any di-
rect or conclusive manner for the prewar period.
48. Adams (1994, p. 156) reports data for ﬁve of the largest German companies for 1975
and 1992, while Brickwell (2001, p. 62) provides an overview of turnout at the general meet-
ing of shareholders of four ﬁnancial services companies in 1998 and 1999.registers of the city where the company has its seat. Moreover, banks may
remain silent on whether or not they cast instructed proxy votes. These
data limitations hamper the investigation of proxy voting, and past studies
have often exacerbated the interpretation problems by constraining their
samples to ﬁrms with dispersed ownership, in which proxy voting by banks
is particularly important.
In one such study, for 1986, ﬁnancial institutions, particularly the big-
three universal banks, proxy votes played a decisive role in the representa-
tion of shares at annual general meetings of shareholders. In the thirty-two
largest corporate ﬁrms with dispersed ownership, on average, 64.5 percent
of shares received representation at the annual general meeting of share-
holders.49While it was very rare that one bank alone dominated the general
annual meeting, taken together, the big-three banks often held a majority
of votes cast (45 percent share on average), and, with the notable exception
of the meetings held by Volkswagen, banks as a group always held a ma-
jority of represented votes (83 percent share on average; Gottschalk
1988).50 The big-three banks also held one-third to one-half of the votes
present at their own general annual meeting (Deutsche Bank: 47.17 per-
cent, Dresdner Bank: 47.08 percent, Commerzbank: 34.58 percent). Al-
though it is unwise to infer any kind of trend, the data for 1990 show a
slight reduction (to 72 percent) in the average share of votes held by the
banks in the top 100 ﬁrms (Baums and Fraune 1995).51The big-three banks
continued to hold substantial voting percentages at their own meetings.
A ﬁner breakdown indicates that only ten of these ﬁrms had truly highly
dispersed share ownership (less than 25 percent of shares held in blocks),
whereas seventeen had some bank-held stake and thirteen had signiﬁcant
(nonbank) block holders (Böhm 1992).52 Proxy voting by banks was great-
est among the ﬁrst group, giving the big-three banks 44 percent of votes
cast at the annual meeting (versus 25 percent of all possible votes). Inter-
estingly, when banks owned their own stakes in ﬁrms, they also held proxy
votes, but they averaged lower total vote percentages (for the big-three
alone, 25 percent of the total or 33 percent of votes present at the meeting)
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49. See Gottschalk (1988). He started with the 100 biggest companies (as measured by
value added in 1984) and selected those ﬁrms whose shares were more than half controlled
by dispersed owners or by banks. He based his calculations on the index of participants
(Teilnehmerverzeichnisse) of the general annual meetings of these companies in 1986 (1987
for some companies).
50. The big-three banks are Deutsche, Dresdner, and Commerzbank; he also included the
Bayrische Vereinsbank, Bayrische Hypo, the state banks (Landesbanken) and savings banks
(Sparkassen), the credit cooperatives (Genossenschaftsbanken), and other ﬁnancial institu-
tions.
51. Their sample contains only twenty-four companies, so it’s possible that fewer ﬁrms had
dispersed ownership, though data availability could also explain part of the diﬀerence in
sample sizes.
52. Only thirty-two of forty attendance lists for annual meetings (Hauptversammlung-
spräsenzlisten) were available.compared to widely held ﬁrms. Not surprisingly, the banks held the fewest
proxy votes in ﬁrms with dominating block holders: the big three held only
6 percent of votes (7 percent present at the annual meeting), and all banks
together held 13 percent (15 percent of those cast at the meeting).
Broadening the sample to include smaller ﬁrms, those with more con-
centrated share ownership, and unlisted companies, the ﬁndings show sig-
niﬁcantly less bank control, especially when instructed proxy votes are
excluded.53 For the Edwards and Nibler (2000) sample from 1992, proxy
votes accounted for a greater share of total bank votes than did actual
equity ownership, and the ﬁgures are far lower than for the more restricted
samples used in other studies: banks as a group averaged an 8.5 percent
share of ﬁrm voting rights in the form of proxy votes, compared to 6.7 per-
cent from equity ownership.54 The banks rarely held any proxy votes in un-
listed ﬁrms but held at least some in the majority of the listed ﬁrms. As with
previous studies, the big-three banks played the dominant role in proxy
voting.55
Given the paucity of proxy voting data before the 1980s, it is diﬃcult to
compare these more recent patterns with those of previous periods. It is
safe to say, however, that proxy voting by banks, especially by the largest
banks, has been a key feature of the connection of banks to corporate own-
ership in Germany since the industrialization period. Moreover, that link
has apparently always been the tightest among large ﬁrms with stock mar-
ket listings and dispersed ownership structures.
4.3 The Underlying Political and Legal Factors
4.3.1 Roots in the Industrialization Period, 1870–1913
Incorporating Firms and Issuing Equity Shares
The majority of German corporations are organized as Aktiengesell-
schaften(AG), literally “share companies.”56Share companies are required
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53. While customers turning over voting rights are explicitly oﬀered the chance to instruct
banks on their voting, only about 2–3 percent of them take this opportunity (Baums 1996).
54. Their sample is based on 156 of the 200 largest nonﬁnancial ﬁrms as measured by in
terms of turnover as of 1992.
55. See also Perlitz and Seger (1994), whose sample consists of 110 (large, listed) industrial
companies of which only 57 could be evaluated for proxy voting and only for 1990. They
found total proxy voting by banks of less than 10 percent in over one-third of the ﬁrms, but
also found 30 percent of ﬁrms (17/57) had at least a majority of represented votes held in
proxy by banks. Also, 83 percent of the 110 ﬁrms had at least one banker on its supervisory
board. Böhm (1992) has similar ﬁndings. See also the earlier study by Cable (1985) on bank
involvement through proxy voting in the 1970s.
56. See Whale (1930), pp. 331–33, for a discussion of diﬀerent company forms in Germany
up to that point (which remain essentially unchanged). But regulations and de facto rights of
shareholders in AGs are very similar to those of the other major type of corporation, the
Kommanditgesellschaften (auf Aktien).to have a general meeting of shareholders (Generalversammlung) and a su-
pervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) to represent shareholders.57 The supervi-
sory board of an AG selects the executive board, a group composed of
high-level ﬁrm managers.
Although the AG form predates the industrialization period, it took
hold only after the liberalization of incorporation laws around 1870. These
legal changes coincided with a rapid development of large-scale industry.
Certain types of industries—particularly the railroads in the late 1830s and
1840s and then the banks in the late 1840s and 1850s—did avail themselves
of the AG form. But the numbers remained low until 1870, when amend-
ments to the 1861 company code (Handelsgestzbuch) replaced state con-
cessions with objective criteria.
In the early years, the importance of the AG grew slowly in comparison
with the personal enterprise. Very few AGs appeared before 1850: esti-
mates put the numbers at only 16 in Prussia between 1800 and 1825, and
112 between 1825 and 1850. In the Bavarian Kingdom, just 6 existed be-
tween 1838 and 1848, and 44 more came in the following decade. The ranks
of AGs expanded faster after 1850, with 336 AGs founded in Prussia up to
1870 and 57 in Saxony, where just 10 existed in the year 1850.58 The real
boom in formation came between 1870 and 1873, with the liberalization of
company laws and the establishment of the German Empire: 928 new AGs
were founded, with a total nominal capital of 2.81 billion marks (Henning
1992, p. 210). Yet, even by 1882, private ﬁrms still accounted for nearly 95
percent of all enterprises in Germany (table 4.1; Gömmel 1992, p. 35). The
numbers exceeded 3,000 by 1890 and stayed well over 5,000 from the late
1890s until at least World War I.
The boom of the early 1870s ended in a prolonged crisis from 1873 to
1879, the eﬀects of which prompted immediate political pressure for re-
structuring the economy and particularly for addressing the state of share-
holder laws. The ensuing ups and downs in the markets and the broader
economy spurred periodic revisions to the law, most of which had relatively
minor impact in an era of overall prosperity and, given the context, liberal
political thinking.59
The ﬁrst of these eﬀorts resulted in the company law of 1884—a revision
to the uniﬁed national regulation of share companies of 1870. The new law
added two important provisions: ﬁrst, it required new corporations to cre-
ate a prospectus, specifying a time period within which the subscriptions
would take place, and, second, it stipulated that the opening general meet-
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supervisory board.
58. Laux (1998) mentions 454 AGs for Prussia up to 1870. See Pross (1965).
59. See Fohlin (2002b, 2006) for a review of the pre-WWI laws and regulations concerning
the stock exchanges and corporations as well as the imposition of taxes on exchange listing
and transactions starting in 1882.ing of shareholders must attract a minimum percentage attendance.60 Un-
derwriting issues on the basis of subscriptions could cause long delays and
put new issues at risk for failure to meet regulations and deadlines. To in-
sure success, companies therefore turned to informed intermediaries—the
universal banks—who would purchase the new capital and subsequently
sell individual equity shares to the public.
A second round of political and legal debates followed the ﬁnancial cri-
sis of the early 1890s (Wiener 1905; Buss 1913; Meier 1993; Schulz 1994).
The resulting stock exchange law in 1896 contained a number of provisions
regarding the issuing and listing of securities, and the revised company law
of 1897 added further stipulations.61The new regulations—mostly making
it more diﬃcult to issue and list stock shares—added to the diﬃculties in
attracting outside investors for ﬁrms and, it is commonly believed, created
a need for greater bank credit, while pushing more securities trading from
the exchanges to the banks. The new law may well have solidiﬁed simulta-
neous founding, and the central position of the universal banks, for stock
issuance. Indeed, Robert Liefmann (1921, p. 476) attributed the form of
the German universal banks partly to the regulations imposed on company
promotions (cited in Whale 1930, p. 40).
The Supervisory Board and Corporate Control
In the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century, while the government still
maintained tight control over incorporation, it imposed little regulation on
corporate governance. The voting rights of shareholders and their repre-
sentation by supervisory boards evolved over time. In the 1840s and ’50s,
scholars wrote on the distribution of voting rights according to share own-
ership.62 Many were concerned about the ability of the smallest sharehold-
ers to be heard and the potential for excessive control by a small number of
large shareholders. As the regulatory stance on incorporation liberalized,
and as vast numbers of ﬁrms began to take advantage of limited liability,
the clear need arose for legal guidelines for corporate control. Of particu-
lar concern were the smallest shareholders, who were often disenfran-
chised and also unable to access information about the ﬁrms in which they
invested. Thus, in promulgating the 1870 company law, the government de-
manded, in return for free incorporation, greater uniformity and consis-
tency in corporate accounting, reporting, and governance (Hopt 1998). In
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60. Text of share company law of 1884 (Gesetz, betreﬀend die Kommanditgesellschaft auf
Aktien und die Aktiengesellschaften), articles 209e and 210. The 1870 company code had al-
ready required the full amount of an issue to be subscribed and at least 25 percent to be paid
up before a new joint-stock company could be founded; for shares issued at higher than nom-
inal value, 50 percent payment was required.
61. See Nussbaum (1910).
62. See Dunlavy (1998).particular, the law stipulated the creation of the dual board structure, in
part as a means of protecting shareholder and public interest, independent
of the management of the company.
The 1884 law added new regulations on corporate governance; among
other stipulations, it prohibited simultaneous positions on the supervi-
sory and executive boards of any one ﬁrm. Former company directors
could, and often did, take seats on the supervisory board, as long as they
had been oﬃcially discharged from the executive board (Handelsgesetz-
buch art. 225a). The 1884 law also explicitly raised the level of responsi-
bility inherent in supervisory board positions. Whereas the 1870 law
granted supervisory board members the right to obtain information
about the company, the 1884 law made such oversight a duty. At the same
time, though the 1870 law stipulated that supervisory board members
must own shares of the ﬁrm on whose board they sat, the 1884 law made
such equity stakes optional.
Shareholder representation also grew more democratic as the nine-
teenth century wore on. The use of proxy voting may have partially allevi-
ated the disenfranchisement problem, since small shareholders—or large
ones—could deposit their shares with a bank and protect their stakes
both literally and ﬁguratively. That is, they found safe storage of easily lost
or stolen bearer shares along with representation of their votes in the gen-
eral meetings of shareholders. Bankers could hypothetically build up sig-
niﬁcant stakes from many disparate small shareholders and thereby attain
far greater standing at the general meeting than could any one small stake-
holder could. As long as the banker could be trusted to vote in the inter-
est of the small shareholders, the system improved their position. This
point leads naturally to questions of corporate control: Who really con-
trolled or controls German corporations—the owners or their proxy
holders?
4.3.2 Postindustrialization Developments
The early post–World War I period brought a wave of company founda-
tions, and the hyperinﬂation of the early 1920s brought an even larger
swelling of the corporate ranks. Financial crisis in 1931 and the ensuing de-
pression of that decade reversed the trend. The Great Depression of the
1930s hit German corporations hard and sent large numbers of them into
insolvency. The wave of corporate failures prompted new calls for reform
to the corporation laws (Handelsgesetzbuch or HGB) as well as the desire
to create a code (Aktiengesetz) speciﬁcally addressing shareholding and
attendant rights and restrictions. Ultimately, the debates led to an “emer-
gency order” (Notverordnung or NotVO) on stock companies. The act, set
into force by the Nazi regime, without parliamentary action, included a tax
credit, stronger regulation of banks, stronger disclosure rules, and several
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vations, played a major role in the patterns of corporate control that
evolved over the rest of the twentieth century.63
The Relationship Between Share Ownership and Voting Rights
Democratic intuition, liberal traditions, and today’s market-orientation
trends suggest that one share should be associated with one vote. Devia-
tions from a one-share-one-vote system, the most important of which ap-
peared in the interwar years, greatly aﬀected patterns of ownership and
control in Germany. Because the disassociation of ownership and control
allowed founders to control their ﬁrms longer than they would have other-
wise, these legal changes altered the fates of families and their ﬁrms.
Multiple-Vote Shares (Mehrstimmrechtsaktien). Mehrstimmrechtsaktien
are quite literally shares that are associated with multiple votes. This means
that a few shares and little capital investment can lead to a lot of voting
power. In the interwar years, this instrument was used extensively and was
usually justiﬁed as means of ﬁghting dilution of family control. Multiple
voting rights helped solve the need for capital after WWI, while allowing
founding families to keep their grip on their ﬁrms (Pross 1965, p. 84).
Based on a large sample of AGs studied by the national statistics oﬃce
(Statistisches Reichsamt), 842 out of 1,595 AGs in 1925, and close to 40
percent out of 913 in 1934, used shares with multiple voting rights. The
votes per share ranged between 20 and 250 times higher than the normal
voting right. These shares, usually associated with just a small fraction of
the overall capital, were loaded with as many votes as necessary for the
domination of the general meeting of shareholders. Usually, these privi-
leged shares were given to members of the Aufsichtsrat or to banks that
committed themselves to vote according to the controlling group. The re-
maining shareholders and any future shareholders eﬀectively lost all
power. According to the Statistisches Reichsamt study, ownership of 10
percent of the shares was suﬃcient to control more than 40 percent of the
votes in 388 companies in 1925. Due to the generally poor attendance at the
general meetings of shareholders, 40 percent of the available votes usually
meant the majority of the votes present (Pross 1965, p. 86).
Multiple-vote shares were prohibited by the reform in 1937; however, the
Nazis apparently made exceptions favoring family enterprises—a topic
that appears again in the next section. The new AktG of 1965 allows
Mehrfachstimmrechte, but only after a special concession to be issued by a
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porate governance institutions. That approach is not intended to minimize the human tragedy
of the Nazi regime.federal minister (AktG para. 12).64 Today they are of little importance,
and, in fact, the new law on control and transparency in the business sphere
(KonTraG 1998) explicitly prohibits the issuing of Mehrstimmrechtsaktien.
Vorratsaktien and Vorzugsaktien. Vorratsaktien (“depot shares”) were
another instrument heavily used in the time of the Weimar Republic. Ac-
cording to Menke (1988), these shares were issued without granting stock-
holders a right to buy them. Oﬃcially, they were created to help the com-
pany react quickly when needed for mergers or acquisitions, and, pending
their use, were not eligible for trade. Their actual purpose was diﬀerent,
though: Menke argues that the shares were loaded with multiple voting
rights in order to keep the control over the company in the hands of the
controlling group or an associated shareholder without having to invest
huge amounts of capital.65 This misuse led to legal changes in 1937, and
they vanished thereafter.
Vorzugsaktien (“preferential shares”) were created for the purpose of
ﬁnancing corporations in trouble. These shares granted holders preferen-
tial rights to dividend payments. This right was oﬀered as an additional in-
centive for investors to buy into a poorly performing company. The shares
came without voting rights, so as to raise substantial infusions of capi-
tal without diluting control of the ﬁrm. The 1937 reform of the AktG
strengthened the right of holders of Vorzugsaktien: not more than 50 per-
cent of the capital could be issued in these preferred shares, they had to
have all other rights associated with shares except for voting, and they re-
gained their voting right if the corporation was one year late with the pay-
ment of the preferential dividend.
Höchststimmrechte and Other Restrictions.Höchststimmrechte(maximum-
voting rights) were rules that prescribed a limit to the number of votes a
shareholder might hold. This could be achieved either directly by allowing
fewer votes than the number of shares of an important shareholder or in-
directly by prohibiting the purchase of more than a certain fraction of the
shares.66 While voting limitations have a long tradition in Germany—
many of the corporations of the early nineteenth century had them—the
rules proved generally ineﬀective, since it was not diﬃcult for a determined
investor to have someone else own the stocks and for that investor to still
control their votes. This instrument could be used to limit the power of ma-
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used after the war: with the inﬂux of “oil dollars” from Near Eastern countries in the 1970s,
these shares may have been used to prevent control losses to governmental investors from
Near Eastern countries.
65. See Menke (1988), p. 98.
66. This section is based on Emmerich (2000) and Fey (2000).jority shareholders, but it also worked as an eﬀective threat against hostile
takeovers. Heavy criticism of this restriction of the market for corporate
control led to legal changes, and in the 1998 reforms Höchststimmrechte
were phased out. The capital market actually rewarded this change: the
prices for stocks from companies with Höchsstimmrechts clauses jumped
when the legal changes were announced. The AktG 1965 had still allowed
them, and even today corporations whose shares are not traded at stock ex-
changes are not subject to the prohibition of Höchststimmrechten. The ra-
tionale is to preserve control of founders—in many cases families—who
are still involved, albeit with reduced ownership stakes, in smaller AGs. Of
course, there are other related restrictions on voting shares, such as mini-
mum stake requirements, and even on attending the general meeting of
shareholders.67
Codetermination. The idea that the management of a stock corporation
should be responsible not only to the shareholders but also to other stake-
holders can also be seen in the codetermination laws. Employees send rep-
resentatives to the supervisory boards in stock corporations. By giving
employees voice without actual ownership, these rules cause a major
deviation from the one-share-one-vote rule. Of course, codetermination
was introduced in order to represent employee interests in the supervisory
boards, regardless of the implications for shareholder rights. Codetermi-
nation may have limited ownership dispersion, because shareholders at-
tempt to counterbalance the power of the employees and prevent the dam-
ages that could occur if management and employees collude.68 Roe argues
that, due to codetermination, managers and large block holders circum-
vented the supervisory board by making decisions outside the board-
room—largely obviating the supervisory board as a governance device. In
addition, he argues that codetermination and block holding are comple-
mentary. That is, dispersed ownership ﬁts poorly with codetermination,
because it prevents block holders from selling their blocks to the public and
also scares oﬀ potential minority investors. Codetermination evolved over
two postwar regulatory episodes in 1951 and 1952 and then in 1972 and
1976. While theoretically appealing, studies that examine the eﬀect on the
shareholders of employees in the supervisory board ﬁnd little or no eﬀect
of codetermination.69
Block Holding and Other Forms of Monitoring. Given this background,
shareholders are left with only one possibility to eﬀectively control man-
agement: block holding as a monitoring device. Dispersed ownership cre-
264 Caroline Fohlin
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69. See Becht, Bolton, and Roëll (2003) for a review, including Svejnar (1981, 1982), Benelli,
Loderer, and Lys (1987), and Baums and Frick (1999).ates managerial agency problems, such as conﬂicts of interest between in-
vestors and managers.70 There are several mechanisms that can mitigate
these costs. Roe (1999) argues that there are four main monitoring mecha-
nisms: market competition, takeovers, good boards of directors, and block
holding. In his view, Germany has few takeovers, is weak at competition,
and does not have strong boards. Hence, he argues, large block holders are
the only control device for monitoring managers. If there is diﬀusion of
ownership, no internal or external control device for the management will
exist. When taken into account with the agency costs in corporate gover-
nance, the diﬀerent mechanisms of monitoring are plausible. As eﬀective
as block holding may be, it is far from clear that it remains the only way of
monitoring in Germany. Based on his empirical study, for example, Köke
(2002, p. 128) argues that lenders use ﬁnancial pressure to exert inﬂuence
on management decisions and thereby positively impact productivity
growth.
Legal Inﬂuences on Bank Control
The Shareholder Law of 1937. Legitimized by an overriding principle of
acting for the good of the whole (known as the Führerprinzip), the 1937
shareholder law weakened the position of the shareholders—in particular,
the general assembly—in favor of the management board (Vorstand). The
management was no longer responsible speciﬁcally for shareholder inter-
ests but for all groups having a stake—ﬁguratively—in the company, in-
cluding the Reich(AktG para. 70I, p. 37).71The new laws eased the process
of transforming stock corporations into partnerships (Umwandlungsge-
setz), while a higher minimum share capital of 500,000 RM impeded the
founding of new stock corporations. While the law did tend to undermine
the use of the AG form, it also simultaneously provided for greater disclo-
sure of information to the public.72
Although both the HGB and the AktG saw registered shares (Namen-
saktien) as the norm, in practice the market was dominated by bearer
shares, because they allowed shareholders to stay anonymous.73Under the
shareholder law of 1937, votes could not be cast by mail, making it even
more likely that shareholders, especially small stakeholders, would be un-
able or unwilling to exercise their ownership rights directly. As an accom-
modation, the law provided two ways for shareholders to cast their votes by
proxy. First, a shareholder could give his bank a Stimmrechtsvollmacht, al-
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its promulgation. Yet the president of the commission for preparing the new Aktiengesetz in
1965, Wilhelmini (1965, p. 153), argued that the 1937 law was not a piece of Nazi work. It
seems that the main components of the law were actually articulated under the previous ad-
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72. See Kübler (1994), p. 12.
73. See von Falkenhausen (1967), p. 69.lowing the bank to cast the votes in the shareholder’s name but also forc-
ing shareholders to reveal their identity. Second, and more important in
practice, the Stimmrechtsermächtigung ceded the shareholder’s voting
rights to the bank.74AStimmrechtsermächtigunghad to be given in written
form and, while valid for up to ﬁfteen months, could be revoked at any
time. This form of proxy voting was later called Bankenstimmrecht or De-
potstimmrecht, due to the heavy use of banks as the proxy holder.75 Inter-
estingly, this new regulation actually weakened the banks’ position, since
some banks had required customers to turn over Stimmrechtsermächtigun-
gen automatically upon opening securities accounts. Even with the new
regulations, banks could still do more or less whatever they wished with the
voting rights that continued to be ceded to them.76
Reforms of 1965. After World War II, American overseers, wanting to in-
troduce shareholder democracy and to limit excessive concentration of
power, began to initiate reforms in the German corporate sector.77 These
reforms, directed largely at the mining industry, included returning to
registered shares, restricting proxy voting by banks to Stimmrechtsvoll-
machten (the weaker form) for every individual general assembly of share-
holders, and outlawing all anonymous voting. The law enacted speciﬁcally
for the privatization of Volkswagen in 1960 (Gesetz zur Privatisierung des
Volkswagenwerkes vom 22.7.1960) contained similar provisions, and the
Schuman plan likewise imposed restrictions on proxy voting by banks in-
volved with mining ﬁrms. Along the way, smaller reforms, called “kleine
Aktienrechtsreform,” tightened accounting standards and rules for build-
ing reserves.
The Aktiengesetz of 1937 was not seen as a major problem by many
politicians in Germany after World War II, and even modern scholars sug-
gest that arguments for reform stemmed from a desire to improve the lot of
small shareholders and to promote a society based on democracy and cap-
italism, rather than to somehow right a wrong that was imposed under the
Nazi regime.78 The general atmosphere of reform that emerged during the
reconstruction period favored a number of alterations to the status quo.
Signiﬁcantly, the 1965 reform bill abolished the Führerprinzip and, while
retaining important powers for the management board, imposed a norm of
majority rule for that body. Other elements of this new law included at-
tempts to eliminate the practice of “silent reserves” that allowed corpora-
266 Caroline Fohlin
74. See Hüﬀer (2002), p. 694. Though similar, the Stimmrechtsermächtigung gave banks
much more power. See also von Falkenhausen (1967), p. 69.
75. Hopt (1996a) calls the Depotstimmrecht a misnomer for that reason. The correct word
is Vollmachtsstimmrecht, but at the moment these words are used synonymously.
76. See von Falkenhausen (1966), p. 71.
77. See von Falkenhausen (1966), p. 70.
78. See Kübler (1994), p. 13 and Gessler (1965), p. 344.tions to hide their true returns, strengthen the general assembly of share-
holders vis-à-vis the management board—especially its director. The law
also mandated greater oversight and control of management by the super-
visory board, greater dispersion of share ownership, improved access to
company information for small shareholders, and even regulation of in-
dustrial groups (Konzern).79
One of the major changes of the 1965 law (AktG 65) concerned the pro-
cess of proxy voting via banks. Under the new law, banks were allowed to
cast votes as a proxy only when they received a written authorization
(schriftliche Vollmacht) (§ 135 I AktG 65). Valid for up to ﬁfteen months,
the authorization could be given for all or only part of a customer’s port-
folio and could be revoked anytime (§ 135 II AktG 65). The shareholder
could now stay anonymous, and banks oﬀering to perform proxy voting
had to oﬀer customers the opportunity to provide speciﬁc instructions on
how to vote (§ 128 II AktG). Likewise, the banks also had to inform their
customers how the bank intended to vote. In the absence of customer in-
structions, the bank could vote according to its own plan (§ 135 V AktG,
§ 128 II AktG).
Recent Reforms.As important as the 1965 reform was, it left the banks with
widespread and easy access to corporate control rights. Pressure for re-
formbegan to build anew as Germany’s postwar economic miracle waned.
By the 1990s, not long after reuniﬁcation with the East, Germany slid into
recession, and political debates focused once again on the power of banks
in Germany’s corporations. As a result, the government enacted three new
laws to modify the existing shareholder law (AktG): speciﬁcally, the 1998
law on control and transparency in corporations (KonTraG 98), the law on
registered shares and facilitation of voting rights (NaStraG 01), and the
law on transparency and publicity (TransPubG 02). Political and public
debates continue over further legislative changes in these areas.
The new laws stipulated some important alterations of corporate own-
ership and control, especially regarding the use of registered shares and
the exercising of proxy voting rights. In the latter case, current law allows
banks to take proxy voting authorization for an unlimited time but requires
the proxy holder to inform shareholders yearly both of their option to re-
voke the authorization and of the opportunity for alternative representa-
tion. In an eﬀort to avoid conﬂicts of interests, banks now also must create
an organizational division of managers who prepare voting plans separate
from other divisions of the bank—in particular, lending divisions. As fur-
ther safeguards against conﬂicts of interest, banks must also inform their
customers about personal linkages, such as bank employee membership
on supervisory boards or major equity holdings in pertinent companies.
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79. See Hopt (1996b), p. 210.Furthermore, banks must also inform shareholders if the bank is a mem-
ber of a consortium that prepared an initial public oﬀering (IPO) or any
issue of shares for a company in question. Notably, banks are not obliged
to provide these services at all—but if they oﬀer to cast votes in general,
they are now required to oﬀer the services to all customers (Kon-
trahierungszwang). This last provision aims to prevent banks from avoid-
ing instructed votes in favor of only unrestricted voting rights.
The most recent regulations to be set in place (TransPubG 02) require
corporations to declare whether they comply with the so-called “Corpo-
rate Governance Codex.” They strengthen the supervisory board by in-
creasing the information provision to that body; strengthen the general as-
sembly of shareholders, among other things, by granting greater control
over the distribution of proﬁts; and speciﬁcally identify new ways for com-
panies to communicate with shareholders and the market, for example, by
broadcasting major meetings on television or via the internet. The under-
lying intent of this law was to bring the German corporate system into line
with international standards and thereby increase the attractiveness of
German ﬁrms in world markets. As further recommendations of the com-
mission on corporate governance (chaired by T. Baums) remain under dis-
cussion, the situation bears continued monitoring.80 Whether Germany
will retain a relationship-oriented system of corporate ownership and gov-
ernance remains to be seen. Whether such a system is desirable, or has in
fact been widespread in Germany, is another question.
4.4 Consequences of German Patterns of 
Corporate Ownership and Control
Many have argued that poor legal protection of minority stockholders
has led to the concentrated ownership found in Germany. Such concentra-
tion can aﬀect ﬁrms in a variety of ways, though the theoretical issues are
less than clear-cut. One possible beneﬁt from concentrated ownership is
better monitoring of management and improved performance. But owner-
ship concentration could also permit block holders to reap private beneﬁts
at the costs of minority shareholders. Private beneﬁts of control, as noted
by Leuz, Nanda, and Wyoscki (2003), range from perquisite consumption
to the transfer of ﬁrm assets to other ﬁrms owned by insiders or their fam-
ilies. Block holders seek to protect their private beneﬁts, beneﬁts that ap-
pear to be enjoyed only by insiders.
The available empirical evidence casts some doubt on these interpreta-
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corporations (see Bundesregierung 2001).tions. Dyck and Zingales (2002) ﬁnd a relatively small private beneﬁt in
Germany as compared to other countries. And, while there does seem to
have been an ongoing concentration process from the end of World War II
until the 1980s, but for the codetermination laws, there was no weakening
in minority shareholder protection. Thus, the German pattern is not ex-
plained well by changes in shareholder protection. The civil law tradition
also provides a weak explanation at best because the German legal tradi-
tion remains fundamentally one of civil law throughout. History suggests
a wide range of political movements that seem to go much farther in ex-
plaining the German case.
Despite the obvious pattern of ownership concentration in Germany, it
is diﬃcult to conclude much about the eﬀects of this structure on corporate
performance. Köke (2002) ﬁnds that ownership concentration in combi-
nation with ﬁerce product market competition increases productivity
growth. Other authors, including Cable (1985), ﬁnd a clear relationship be-
tween ownership concentration and corporate performance. Lehmann
and Weigand (2000) argue that the relationship depends on the type of
owner. Gorton and Schmid (2000) also ﬁnd a clear relationship. Edwards
and Nibler (2000) argue that minority shareholders gain beneﬁts from an
increase in ownership concentration, though this, however, does not hold
for nonbank ﬁrms and public-sector bodies. They also ﬁnd that the pres-
ence of second and third large shareholders is generally beneﬁcial, except,
again, for nonbank ﬁrms. This could point to a conﬂict of interests that
Iber (1985) also describes.
Another question is of a more dynamic nature: Audretsch and Elston
(1997) pose the question as to whether the German system is capable of ﬁ-
nancing new and innovative ﬁrms. The question remains—is there truly a
negative impact on the ﬁrm or economy level, even though the stock mar-
kets have clearly lost considerable ground since the interwar years? Franks
and Mayer hold that while patterns of ownership do diﬀer markedly be-
tween German companies on the one hand and U.K. and U.S. ﬁrms on the
other, corporate control is similar. They also ﬁnd little relation between
concentration of ownership and the disciplining of management in poorly
performing ﬁrms, and between the type of concentrated owner and board
turnover (Franks and Mayer 2001, p. 974).
These ﬁndings for the recent period echo the historical ﬁndings for Ger-
many overall: in the two decades before World War I, when the German
economy combined large-scale, universal banking with active markets,
managerial turnover was highly sensitive to the performance of ﬁrms.81
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81. See Fohlin (2006). These ﬁndings stem from the regression of managerial board
turnover on various indicators of ﬁrm performance (return on assets [ROA], dividends, and
dividend-adjusted stock returns) plus a series of control variables and indicator variables for
various subpopulations, such as ﬁrms with and without stock market listings and ﬁrms with
and without bank directors on their boards.Moreover, ﬁrms with listings on the Berlin stock exchange—that is, those
that were most likely to be owned by external shareholders rather than
founding families or other block holders—changed management even
more in response to poor performance. In general, listed ﬁrms performed
better, earning higher ROA and paying far higher dividends.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
This paper patches together the sometimes-spotty evidence on the struc-
ture of corporate ownership and control in Germany since the beginning
of free incorporation (1870) and demonstrates several ups and downs that
correspond largely to manifold political, legal, and economic events and
crises. The discussion raises several particularly important points, summa-
rized here.
4.5.1 Historical Patterns
• Corporate governance institutions—executive and supervisory
boards—remained quite underdeveloped in Germany until the last
quarter of the nineteenth century. Boards were generally small and
grew little over the pre–World War I period.
• Universal banks had signiﬁcant but not overwhelming presence in the
governance of German corporations during this period of rapid heavy
industrialization and economic expansion (roughly 1895–1912). Sim-
ilarly, industrial ﬁrms played only a small role in the ownership and
governance of other nonﬁnancial ﬁrms. Notably, ﬁnancial ﬁrms, es-
pecially the large banks, did own shares in other banks and subsidi-
aries and did sit on the boards of those banks.
• Bank involvement in corporate ownership appears to have arisen
largely out of active bank involvement with securities issues, particu-
larly of listed ﬁrms. Substantial holdings were rare, though earlier uni-
versal banks (e.g., Discontogesellschaft in the 1850s) did sometimes
unwillingly hold large stakes that could not be sold oﬀ for a period of
time.
• Bank involvement in corporate control through interlocking direc-
torates is closely related to ﬁrm size, sector, securities issue, and stock
market listing. Control rights appear to have been granted largely via
proxy voting for customers who deposited bearer shares with the bank.
• The combination of commercial, investment, and brokerage services
within individual banking institutions may have facilitated the net-
working of bank and ﬁrm supervisory boards.
• Traditional explanations of German bank-ﬁrm relationships that fo-
cus on bank intervention in investment decisions and direct monitor-
ing of debt contracts ﬁnd little support in the available empirical anal-
ysis.
270 Caroline Fohlin4.5.2 Comparisons with Modern Germany
• German corporate ownership continues to be often very concen-
trated, but nonﬁnancial ﬁrms appear to be more heavily involved in
ownership of other nonﬁnancial ﬁrms than they were before WWI.
• Modern patterns of bank involvement in corporate ownership and
control are remarkably similar to those of the late industrialization pe-
riod. The war period, roughly 1915–1945, was probably an aberration
from long-run patterns. Contrary to popular myth, banks do not—
and never did—control most of the corporate economy. But they do
participate actively—as they always have—in the ownership and con-
trol of a notable minority of corporations. Bank involvement contin-
ues to relate signiﬁcantly to dispersion of corporate ownership, ﬁrm
size, securities issue, and stock market listing—all pointing at proxy
voting for customers depositing shares with the bank.
In light of these patterns, I argue that political, social, and economic fac-
tors constitute the proximate causes of change. Moreover, combining recent
evidence oﬀered in the corporate control literature with my own study of an
extensive range of German corporations from the pre-WWI period, I argue
that German ownership structures have not, in times of stability, produced
the negative consequences predicted in much of the “law and ﬁnance” liter-
ature.82 Indeed, the long-run perspective on Germany—particularly the
wide swings in corporate and industrial concentration, along with positive
ﬁndings on corporate performance in the pre-WWI and post-WWII eras—
casts doubt on the notion that civil law traditions per se consistently un-
dermine market functioning. In the German case, the string of disastrous
political institutions and movements in the aftermath of World War I, cul-
minating in the Nazi regime, dismantled the rich, highly functioning, hybrid
ﬁnancial system of the Second Empire. The postwar political and legal cli-
mate, one that continues to suppress the liberal tradition of the pre–World
War I era, seemingly prevents the old dual system from reemerging.
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Comment Alexander Dyck
The German economic system has performed remarkably well since in-
dustrialization. Firms and entrepreneurs have beneﬁted from access to
deep ﬁnancial markets. Combining together the private sector’s borrowing
from banks and the capitalization in equity markets, Rajan and Zingales
(1998) estimate that Germany has the second-deepest market for provid-
ing external ﬁnance to ﬁrms among forty-one countries in the world. Ap-
parently, these ﬁnancial resources have been deployed eﬃciently. Wurgler
(2000) estimates that Germany has the highest eﬃciency of investment in
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the University of Toronto.the world (proxied by sensitivity of industry investment to value added).
And such eﬃciency is reﬂected in high rates of per capita GDP growth and
the maintenance of a high level of income per capita since the 1870s (e.g.,
Maddison 1991).
It is worthwhile repeating these numbers, because if we were told just
about the features of the German corporate sector, such outcomes are not
what most of us would predict. Here, the traditional characterization goes,
is a country dominated by very concentrated ownership structures, with
weak protections for investors (one out of six, according to LaPorta et al.
1998), very limited equity markets, an almost complete absence of takeovers,
and an overwhelming inﬂuence of the banking sector, among both listed and
unlisted ﬁrms. Is this traditional characterization accurate, and, if so, why
didn’t this change over time, as it did in countries like the United States and
Britain, and how could such corporate structures not lead to signiﬁcant in-
eﬃciency rather than the positive indicators described above?
Caroline Fohlin, in this chapter on the history of corporate ownership
and control in Germany, provides some new evidence and a new perspec-
tive on some of these questions. Fohlin sidesteps questions of economic
performance and links between ownership and performance to focus on
the evolution of corporate ownership and the role of relationship banking.
She concentrates, in particular, on increasing our understanding of the
growth of the corporate sector prior to World War I. And she brings to
bear a wealth of data and a determination to rely on data-led conclusions.
The paper’s ﬁrst contribution is to provide some additional information
on the origin and evolution of concentrated ownership structures in Ger-
many. Fohlin reports that the entrepreneurs who founded many German
corporations in the latter half of the nineteenth century retained signiﬁ-
cant corporate stakes for themselves and families. The story, interestingly,
is then one of gradual dispersion of ownership and professionalization of
management. But this dispersion halts rather abruptly at a high level of
concentrated ownership in the interwar period. Perhaps more surprising is
that in the postwar period, including when the Allies were in control, con-
centration persists and is stable until the most recent years.
Fohlin provides some evidence as to the driving forces behind these
changes, for example, pointing to the emergence and wholesale endorse-
ment of shares with multiple voting rights—whereby more than 50 percent
of AGs in 1925 and 40 percent in 1934 had such voting rights—as an in-
gredient in maintaining concentrated control, as well as political changes
in the Nazi era. But, unfortunately, other factors escape examination. Why
didn’t the founding families sell out? Why didn’t those with signiﬁcant mi-
nority stakeholders (like banks) sell out? Was it fear of tax implications of
sales, or was it something else? These questions remain for the future.
The real heart of the paper, though, is not about concentrated ownership
but about banks. Here Fohlin, step by step, asks the reader to reevaluate
278 Caroline Fohlinthe notion that German banks controlled German corporations, through
their direct equity stakes, their seats on supervisory boards, or the addi-
tional voting power arising from their holding of proxy voting rights for
small shareholders. The target in this discussion is clearly a view in some of
the literature that suggests overwhelming power of the great banks in cor-
porate decision making.
Fohlin correctly asks us to center our attention on the voting power of
banks. This is important, as certain major decisions are put to a vote at the
general assembly as well as being the forum to appoint members of the
managing board and the supervisory board. On the basis of extensive data
collection eﬀorts in the pre–World War I period she concludes that the
great banks had 7–11 percent of their assets in the form of corporate equi-
ties, with provincial banks having slightly lower levels. And she points to
more detailed studies of speciﬁc great banks to show that these levels likely
are based on more signiﬁcant stakes in a small number of ﬁrms. Fohlin in-
cidentally tells a fascinating story of how in the latter half of the nineteenth
century banks acquired equity stakes, almost incidentally, as a result of
their investment banking arms and their lending operations. Here under-
writing operations led ﬁrms to accumulate stakes, and these stakes multi-
plied in times of crisis when debt was exchanged for equity.
But her analysis does little to convince those without any vested interest
in the debate about the power of banks to change their prior estimate that
banks play an important role in corporate decision making. Focusing on
equity stakes is likely to dramatically understate voting power. The most
important reason for this is the traditional story of the free-rider problem
faced by small shareholders. They cannot get suﬃcient reward, given their
small stakes, to go through the eﬀort to get informed and vote on corpo-
rate decisions, so anyone with a larger stake with a lower cost of getting in-
formed (e.g., banks) is more likely to vote and have more eﬀective voting
power than is suggested by their stakes. In addition, in Germany there is
the important fact that shareholders held bearer shares and that overtime
banks oﬀered services of holding those shares, and when they did so they
held the proxy voting rights attached to these shares. This dramatically in-
creased their voting power both in ﬁrms where they held equity stakes and
in ﬁrms where they held no stakes.
The evidence on the composition of supervisory boards, which is where
Fohlin directs our attention next, is a well-chosen sample to use to test for
the power of banks, for it is a decision where votes will matter, and it is a
decision where it is possible with eﬀort to see whether banks get what they
want, as measured by the identity of the board members. Again, Fohlin
does an impressive job of accumulating and organizing data on board
memberships in the pre–World War I period. And again, Fohlin’s charac-
terization of the data as revealing the weakness of the banks doesn’t ﬁt with
my reading of the evidence.
The History of Corporate Ownership and Control in Germany 279Toher, it is a reﬂection of weakness that “only two-thirds of the sampled
ﬁrms fall into the attached category,” meaning that in two-thirds of ﬁrms
there is a board representative who shares a position on a ﬁrm and repre-
sentation in a bank, that “half of the ﬁrms had a bank director sitting on
their supervisory boards” and that “less than 22 percent of ﬁrms had a
bank director as chair or vice chair.” I guess my prior is just diﬀerent from
hers, as two-thirds with a connection, half with a direct member, and one-
ﬁfth with a commanding position suggests that the banks could use their
voting power to protect their interests. This is signiﬁcant bank involve-
ment, and one suspects that if ﬁrms were ranked based on economic im-
portance (e.g., just the top 100 companies) these percentages would in-
crease, as the numbers do in the post–World War II period when Fohlin
focuses on larger ﬁrms.
Also somewhat surprising since the discussion is of bank power is the
lack of attention played to banks as providers of external ﬁnance to com-
panies, and the relative importance of the vast stable of middle-sized com-
panies, collectively called the mittelstand.Of course, through the provision
of working capital and longer-term loans, banks have inﬂuence over com-
panies. And this is only enhanced by the stable banking relationships where
ﬁrms often established a near exclusive relationship with a speciﬁc bank,
often called a hausbank.This inﬂuence of banks through their provision of
external ﬁnance will of course be more important for the mittelstand, who
lack the ability to raise ﬁnance through issuing equity, as well as ﬁnding it
challenging to raise any bond ﬁnancing.
So, to summarize, Fohlin successfully dislodges an extreme view of a
domination of the corporate sector by the great banks, but based on this
evidence a careful reader should do little to update prior estimates of the
important role played by German banks in corporate life. While clearly not
in absolute control, the evidence suggests a signiﬁcant role indeed.
Toﬁnish, it is useful to return once again to the question of performance.
While the evidence in this paper enriches our understanding, it also essen-
tially conﬁrms the traditional wisdom of the importance of concentrated
ownership and banks in the German corporate sector. We are left with
Fohlin’s conclusion that “German ownership structures have not, in times
of stability, produced the negative consequences predicted in much of the
‘law and ﬁnance’ literature.” But we do not know why these structures
weren’tassociated with worse performance. What, if anything, reduced the
extent of pyramid structures that we associated with the worst corporate
abuses? Did ﬁrms avoid the “stupid heir” problem of an incompetent next
generation, and how did they do so? Why didn’t banks use their dominant
position on boards to protect their interests as debt holders or use this
position to loot ﬁrms? What role has extensive product market competi-
tion (and an export orientation) played in limiting the potential extent of
280 Caroline Fohlinprivate beneﬁts and agency costs for ﬁrms? And what role has bank com-
petition played in avoiding the development of bad incentives in ﬁrms?
There is clearly room for more research here, to enrich our understand-
ing and to alert us to gaps in our models and in our thinking. And good,
careful historical research like this will be an important complement to the
cross-sectional evidence that is the focus of much research today.
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